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THE CORPORATION  INCOME  TAX has been the focus of much criticism  and 
debate in the United States during the past decade. Many hold it 
responsible  for the low level of business  investment  in the United  States, 
and it has been criticized as a fundamentally  unfair and illogical tax 
because it taxes corporations  as independent  entities, regardless  of the 
tax  brackets  of individual  shareholders.  Much  of the  academic  discussion 
in the 1970s  about  reform  of the corporate  tax centered  on the integration 
of corporate  and individual  income taxes, to make the corporate tax 
essentially a withholding  mechanism  for the individual  income tax.' 
More recently the emphasis has shifted toward reform  by repeal, and 
indeed President Reagan himself has called for the abolition of the 
corporate  tax. 
Any analysis of the current  economic effects of the U.S. corporate 
tax should begin with the recognition  of what has happened  over the 
years to corporate  tax revenues. Put simply,  the corporate  tax has been 
disappearing.  The marked  drift  in composition  of federal  revenues  away 
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from the corporate tax is illustrated in table 1, which presents the 
revenues from income taxes since  1953 as a percentage of federal 
revenues and GNP. The year 1953  is significant,  for it was in 1954  that 
Congress passed the first of many tax acts that have successively 
shortened  the lifetimes  over which  tax deductions  for depreciation  could 
be taken and accelerated  the depreciation  deductions  within such life- 
times. The common practice through 1953 was to use  straight-line 
depreciation  for tax purposes  over the allowed  "useful" lives for assets. 
In that year the corporation  income tax accounted for 28.4 percent of 
federal  receipts  and  5.4 percent  of GNP. Of total income tax receipts, it 
accounted  for about 39 percent. Throughout  the late 1950s  and most of 
the 1960s,  corporate  revenues  provided  about  one-third  of total income 
tax revenues. A familiar  rule of thumb  from that era was that tax cuts 
should  be "one-third  business,  two-thirds  individual,  " perhaps  reflecting 
this relatively stable ratio. By  1980, the year before passage of the 
Economic Recovery Tax Act, corporate  revenues had declined to half 
the level that  existed in 1953,  relative  to GNP. The  experience  since then 
and estimates  for the next five years show important  additional  erosion 
in the corporate  tax as a revenue  source. 
This steady downward  trend  stands  in contrast  to the stability  of the 
individual  income  tax, which has ranged  only between 42.8 percent  and 
49.0 percent  of revenues  over the same  period,  and  between 7.4 percent 
and  9.9 percent  of GNP. The corporate  tax will provide  revenue in 1983 
equal  to only a small  fraction  of the concurrent  annual  federal  deficit. It 
is in light of this low level of receipts that many have called for the 
abolition  of the corporate  tax; though  if the trend in table 1 continues, 
little action toward this goal might seem to be required. However, 
changes in aggregate  revenues convey only limited information  about 
the economic impact of the corporate  tax. Underlying  these statistics 
are  important  distortions  in the ways firms  behave, with  respect  not only 
to the overall  level of investment  but also financial  policy, asset choice, 
and the degree of risk-taking.  The decline in corporate  tax collections 
does not necessarily  indicate  a corresponding  reduction  in such distor- 
tions. 
The purpose  of this paper  is to provide  an economic analysis of the 
impact  of the corporate  tax in the United  States as it is now and  has been 
during  the postwar  years. Among  the findings  are  the following. 
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Table 1.  Sources of Federal Revenues, Fiscal Years 1953-88 
Individual income 
taxa  Corporate income  tax 
Percent  of  Percent  of 
federal  Percent  federal  Percent 
Year  revenues  of GNPb  revenues  of GNPb 
1953  45.2  8.6  28.4  5.4 
1954  46.0  8.3  26.3  4.7 
1955  44.1  7.4  28.0  4.5 
1956  44.0  8.0  28.2  5.1 
1957  45.3  8.3  25.7  4.7 
1958  46.5  8.1  22.9  4.0 
1959  44.7  7.8  25.1  4.4 
1960  44.8  8.4  23.5  4.4 
1961  45.9  8.3  21.1  3.8 
1962  45.4  8.4  21.8  4.0 
1963  45.1  8.3  21.2  3.9 
1964  43.9  8.0  22.2  4.0 
1965  42.8  7.4  22.6  3.9 
1966  43.3  7.6  23.2  4.1 
1967  44.1  8.1  20.8  3.8 
1968  44.7  8.2  20.7  3.8 
1969  47.5  9.6  19.4  3.9 
1970  48.3  9.5  16.9  3.3 
1971  45.7  8.2  16.6  3.0 
1972  47.1  8.5  16.0  2.9 
1973  44.6  8.1  17.1  3.1 
1974  45.2  8.6  16.0  3.0 
1975  45.0  8.2  14.7  2.7 
1976  43.6  8.0  16.7  3.1 
1977  45.4  8.7  16.1  3.1 
1978  45.0  8.6  16.2  3.1 
1979  46.3  9.2  15.8  3.1 
1980  47.6  9.5  13.3  2.7 
1981  47.5  9.9  11.5  2.4 
1982  49.0  9.9  8.1  1.6 
1983c  47.2  8.9  6.6  1.3 
1984c  45.1  8.4  8.5  1.6 
1985c  44.9  8.4  9.1  1.7 
1986c  45.0  8.3  9.6  1.8 
1987c  45.2  8.3  10.1  1.9 
1988c  44.6  8.3  10.0  1.8 
Sources:  The  1953-57  period-Economic  Report of the Presidentt, Januiary 1977, table B-72;  1958-82-Economic 
Report of the President, February 1983, table B-76; 1983-88-Congressional  Budget Office, baseline budget projections 
for fiscal years  1984-88. 
a.  Includes estate  and gift taxes  and nontax receipts,  the last of which are not a significant amount. 
b.  For  1953-82,  fiscal year revenues  are divided  by calendar year GNP. 
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fixed investment  in the aggregate  has declined steadily since the early 
1950s.  At its minimum,  in 1981,  the marginal  corporate  tax rate  was less 
than  one-third  of its 1953  level. 
2. Despite this reduction  in the marginal  tax rate on capital  taken as 
an aggregate, the social cost of misallocation of capital within the 
corporate  sector  that  resulted  from  differential  asset taxation,  measured 
as a fraction of the corporate capital stock, increased over the same 
period,  reaching  an estimated  peak  of 3.90 percent  in 1973,  and  equaling 
3.19 percent in 1981  with the passage of the Economic Recovery Tax 
Act. 
3. The absence of tax refunds  for losses incurred  by corporations 
results in firms  with different  earnings  histories having  different  incen- 
tives to invest. Fully taxable firms quite possibly possess a stronger 
incentive to invest than those in the apparently  favorable position of 
having previous losses to carry forward. This prospect has been in- 
creased  by recent  legislation  accelerating  depreciation  schedules. 
4.  The effect of inflation  on the incentive  to invest is highly  sensitive 
to the proportion  of debt  finance  and  the gap  between ordinary  personal 
and  corporate  tax rates. Differences  in assumptions  about  these param- 
eters have led to greatly  varying  estimates  of the impact  of inflation,  with 
the direction  as well as the magnitude  subject  to dispute. 
5. Tax reform proposals should distinguish  between tax revenues 
and  marginal  tax rates. Given  the current  pattern  of asset taxation,  much 
of the present value of revenues that will come from the corporate  tax 
can be attributed  to assets already in place. Hence abolition of the 
corporate  tax  would  accomplish  a small  reduction  in  the  average  marginal 
tax rate at the expense of a large, essentially lump-sum  transfer  to the 
owners  of existing  capital.  This  transfer  would  have been approximately 
$427  billion  in 1981. 
The paper  begins  with  a review  of the corporate  tax and  its provisions 
and  the major  changes  that  generated  the pattern  of revenues  presented 
in table 1. 
The Corporate Tax: 1953-81 
The corporate tax is essentially a flat rate tax; it is currently 46 
percent.2  There  has been little movement  in the statutory  corporate  tax 
2.  Under current  law the first $100,000  of a corporation's  income is taxed at rates Alan J. Auerbach  455 
rate during  the past three decades. As shown in the second column of 
table 2, the rate was reduced  from  52 percent  to 48 percent by the 1964 
tax cut, raised temporarily  by the 10 percent Vietnam  War surcharge, 
and  lowered  again  by the tax act of 1978  to its current  level. Most of the 
"action" in the corporate  tax has come from  changes  in the tax base. 
The tax base for a nonfinancial  corporation  investing  in fixed assets 
is derived  by subtracting  from  gross sales the costs of inputs  (including 
wages and materials),  capital  costs (through  depreciation  allowances), 
and interest payments. This base is effectively reduced when any of 
these components increases or when tax credits are allowed against 
calculated  tax liabilities.  Through  various legislation, there have been 
increases in levels of depreciation  allowances and credits at any given 
level of income. Increases in the inflation  rate have brought  declines in 
the real value of depreciation  allowances  and measured  materials  costs 
and  increases  in interest  payments. 
Either  through  shortened  tax lifetimes  or increased  speed of write-off 
over such lifetimes, depreciation  allowances were accelerated  in 1954, 
1962,  1971,  and  1981.  All  these actions  had  the  effect  of raising  the  present 
value of depreciation allowances received per dollar invested. The 
investment  tax credit  was introduced  in 1962,  briefly  suspended  in 1966, 
removed in 1969, reinstated  in 1971, increased  in 1975, and altered by 
both  the 1981  and 1982  tax  acts.3 Thus,  there  has  been  a general  legislative 
movement  toward  reduced  corporate  taxation,  since  most  nonresidential 
fixed investment  is undertaken  by corporations. 
As has been emphasized  by many authors, inflation  affects taxable 
corporate  profits  in three important  ways.4  To the extent that the first- 
below  the maximum  rate  of 46 percent.  The only important  class of corporation  taxpayers 
without  most income  in the top bracket  are companies  with  negative  taxable  income  that 
face a tax rate  of zero. This is discussed  further  below. 
3. For a historical review of these changes, see Alan J. Auerbach, "The New 
Economics  of Accelerated  Depreciation,  "  Boston  College  Law Review,  vol. 23  (September 
1982), pp. 1327-55. 
4. See, for  example,  John  B. Shoven  and  Jeremy  I. Bulow, "Inflation  Accounting  and 
Nonfinancial  Corporate  Profits:  Physical  Assets," BPEA,  3:1975,  pp.  557-98;  T. Nicholaus 
Tideman  and  Donald  P. Tucker,  "The  Tax  Treatment  of Business  Profits  Under  Inflationary 
Conditions,"  in Henry  J. Aaron,  ed., Inflation  and  the  Income  Tax  (Brookings  Institution, 
1976),  pp. 33-77;  Martin  S. Feldstein  and  Lawrence  Summers,  "Inflation  and  the  Taxation 
of Capital  Income in the Corporate  Sector," National Tax  Journal,  vol. 32 (December 
1979),  pp. 445-70; and Alan J. Auerbach, "Inflation  and the Tax Treatment  of Firm 
Behavior,"  American Economic  Review,  vol.  71 (May  1981, Papers  and Proceedings, 
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Table 2.  Average Corporate Tax Rates,  1953-82 
Percent 
Average  Statutory 
corporate  corporate 
Year  ratea  rate  Difference 
1953  55.9  52.0  -  3.9 
1954  50.0  52.0  2.0 
1955  48.4  52.0  3.6 
1956  50.3  52.0  1.7 
1957  49.4  52.0  2.6 
1958  49.4  52.0  2.6 
1959  47.6  52.0  4.4 
1960  47.7  52.0  4.3 
1961  46.9  52.0  5.1 
1962  42.4  52.0  9.6 
1963  42.2  52.0  9.8 
1964  40.5  50.0  9.5 
1965  38.6  48.0  9.4 
1966  39.6  48.0  8.4 
1967  39.4  48.0  8.6 
1968  44.0  52.8  8.8 
1969  46.4  52.8  6.4 
1970  47.9  49.2  1.3 
1971  45.1  48.0  2.9 
1972  43.1  48.0  4.9 
1973  45.2  48.0  2.8 
1974  54.4  48.0  -6.4 
1975  45.8  48.0  2.2 
1976  46.2  48.0  1.8 
1977  43.5  48.0  4.5 
1978  43.2  48.0  4.8 
1979  45.0  46.0  1.0 
1980  46.6  46.0  -0.6 
1981  42.6  46.0  3.4 
1982  36.5  46.0  9.5 
Sources:  Average rates are from Economnic  Report of the Presidenit, Februarv 1983, table B-82; statutory rates are 
from appendix A. 
a.  Corporate tax  liability as  a percentage  of  corporate  profits with  inventory  valuation and capital consumption 
adjustments. 
in, first-out  (FIFO) inventory method is used, rising prices lead to an 
understatement  of  materials costs,  and purely nominal "inventory 
profits" are taxed. Because depreciation allowances are based on 
historical  asset cost, their  real value declines with increases  in the price 
level. Finally, nominal  interest  payments  include an inflation  premium Alan J. Auerbach  457 
that is  essentially a return of  principal to  bondholders. Yet  these 
payments  are  fully deductible  to the corporate  borrower.  This last effect 
works against the first two, lowering corporate  tax liabilities, though 
there may be offsetting  effects at the individual  level, both with respect 
to the taxation  of interest  received  and nominal  capital  gains  on stock.5 
The combined  impact  of changes  in the tax law and, through  modifi- 
cations in the inflation  rate, implicit  changes in the treatment  of inven- 
tories and depreciation  can be seen in table 2, which compares  average 
corporate  tax rates (corporate  taxes as a percentage  of corporate  profits 
corrected  with the capital  consumption  and inventory  valuation  adjust- 
ments) over the past thirty years with the statutory  tax rates over the 
same period. (Since nominal  interest  payments  are deducted  from this 
profits  measure, as well as the tax base, increases in interest  payments 
lower both numerator  and denominator  of the average  tax rate calcula- 
tion.) The primary  differences  in the two tax rates  for a given year  come 
from investment tax credits and discrepancies between estimates of 
actual depreciation  and materials  costs and those actually  deducted  on 
tax returns.  When  the statutory  rate  exceeds the average  rate, the effect 
of investment  tax credits and accelerated  depreciation  allowances out- 
weighs the erosion of such allowances and taxation  of inventory  gains 
caused by inflation. 
The effects of both legislated  and inflation-induced  tax changes can 
be clearly seen in the table. In 1953 the average corporate tax rate 
exceeded the statutory rate. Since the inflation  rate in that year was 
below 1  percent,  this must  be due to the use of straight-line  depreciation 
that  was less generous  than  the economic  depreciation  estimated  for the 
national  income accounts. With the 1954  legislation, average tax rates 
fell below 52 percent. The gap widened  further  with the introduction  of 
the investment  tax credit  in 1962.  As inflation  increased  in the late 1960s, 
the gap narrowed  again, increasing  with the additional  tax incentives of 
1971  and 1975  and decreasing  in years of serious inflation  such as 1974. 
Except for the initial drop in the early 1950s and the recent decline 
caused by the 1981 and 1982 legislation, there is no obvious trend in 
average  corporate  tax rates  during  the period. 
There are two factors that reconcile these results with the declining 
5. Estimates  of the inflation-induced  tax payments  at  the individual  level  are  presented 
in Feldstein  and  Summers,  "Inflation  and  the Taxation  of Capital  Income  in  the Corporate 
Sector." 458  Brookings Paper-s on Economic  Activity,  2:1983 
revenues shown in table 1. First, the increase in nominal  interest rates 
during  the 1970s,  combined  with a relatively  stable  aggregate  corporate 
debt-equity  ratio, decreased  measured  corporate  profits  as a fraction  of 
GNP.6 Second, even with interest payments added back in, there is 
evidence that the total return  to corporate  capital declined during  the 
1970s.7  Neither of these factors necessarily indicates  a lessening of the 
impact  of the corporate  tax on behavior,  as discussed  below. 
The Recent Tax Acts 
The Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981  substantially  reduced the 
corporate  tax burden  by replacing  the system of numerous  asset depre- 
ciation classes with three "capital  recovery" classes. Light equipment 
can be written  off over three  years, other  equipment  over five years, and 
business structures  over fifteen  years. The associated  reduction  in taxes 
was mitigated  by the passage  of the Tax Equity  and  Fiscal  Responsibility 
Act of 1982, which repealed  accelerations  in the write-off  pattern  that 
were to have occurred  in 1985  and 1986  and  instituted  a basis  adjustment 
of 50 percent  for the investment  tax credit. That is, investors receiving 
the 10  percent  investment  tax credit  now  receive  depreciation  deductions 
on a base of 95 cents per  dollar  of capital  purchased.8  Another  important 
change brought  about by the 1982  act was the reduction  and eventual 
repeal of the "safe-harbor  leasing" mechanism  introduced  by the 1981 
act to facilitate the transfer of tax deductions and credits from one 
company (typically  not with positive taxable income) to another. This 
last change  is discussed in greater  detail  below. 
The estimated  net impact  of the 1981  and 1982  acts on corporate  tax 
revenues is evident in tables 1 and 2. As a percent of GNP, corporate 
6.  For more detail on this debt-equity  ratio see Roger H. Gordon  and Burton  G. 
Malkiel,  "Corporation  Finance," in Henry  J. Aaron  and  Joseph  A. Pechman,  eds., How 
Taxes Affect Economic Behavior (Brookings Institution,  1981), pp. 131-96. 
7. This point  is the subject  of some dispute.  Although  Martin  Feldstein  and  Lawrence 
Summers,  "Is the Rate  of Profit  Falling?"  BPEA, 1:1977, pp. 211-28, argue  that  observed 
declines  were primarily  cyclical, recent  evidence  presented  in Barry  Bosworth,  "Capital 
Formation  and Economic  Policy," BPEA, 2:1982, pp. 273-317,  makes  a compelling  case 
for a secular  decline  in the rate  of return  to capital. 
8. These changes  are described  in more  detail  in Auerbach,  "The New Economics  of 
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tax collections fell by approximately  40 percent  from 1980  to 1982,  and 
the average  corporate  tax rate  fell to a new low in 1982. 
Identifying the Appropriate  Marginal Tax Rate 
Many  authors  have used average  tax rates such as those in table 1 or 
related  measures  incorporating  interest  payments  and personal  taxes to 
determine  the impact of the corporate  tax on the incentive to invest.9 
For several important  reasons, however, such measures may fail to 
capture  changes in the marginal  tax rate on income from new capital 
investment. 
RETURNS  TO  NONCAPITAL  FACTORS 
Corporations  receive income in excess of a competitive return  to 
capital.  The sources of such income may include  but are not limited  to 
the entrepreneurial  ability of management  and the exercise of market 
power. Because such income does not come from depreciable  capital 
that benefits from accelerated depreciation allowances, nor does it 
qualify  for an investment  tax credit, it faces an effective tax rate equal 
to 46 percent. Such taxation  is not directly  relevant  to the incentive to 
invest in  fixed  capital,  but  is incorporated  in measured  average  tax rates. 
RETURNS  TO  OLD  CAPITAL 
Even when the tax law is not changed over time (by legislation or 
inflation),  assets of different  vintages  face different  tax rates in a given 
year  on the income  they  generate.  This  is easily illustrated  by considering 
equipment  purchased under the 1981 tax law. After five years, the 
equipment  receives no depreciation  allowances-its  gross rents  are  fully 
taxed. In the year of its purchase, the equipment  received not only a 
substantial  depreciation  allowance (15 percent) but also a 10 percent 
investment tax credit.10  Because of the acceleration of depreciation 
9.  See, for example, Feldstein  and Summers,  "Inflation  and the Taxation  of Capital 
Income  in the Corporate  Sector." 
10. The 15 percent allowance corresponds  to half of the first year of depreciation 
permitted  a five-year  asset under  the 150  percent  declining  balance  formula.  The so-called 
half-year  convention  built into the 1981  formulas  gives assets a half year of allowances 
during  the first  year, irrespective  of purchase  date. 460  Brookings Papers  on Economic  Activity,  2:1983 
allowances  relative  to actual  depreciation,  taxable  income  is lower  in the 
early years of the asset's life and higher  in the later years than a true 
measure  of income.  Assets face higher  taxes on the income  they  generate 
in later years relative to  earlier years. Since a capital investment 
generates  income  over many  years, these tax rates must  be combined  in 
some useful way to  derive the overall impact of  taxation on that 
investment. Simple averaging  of tax rates over vintages of assets in a 
given year does not give the correct  answer:  as a result  of changes  in the 
tax code, assets of older vintages  are currently  being  depreciated  under 
tax rules that do not apply  to new investment;  there  is no reason  for the 
relative quantities of capital by vintage to correspond  to the relative 
incomes, which differ at different  ages for a given vintage;  and simple 
averaging  ignores discounting. I return  to this subject below to show 
how the appropriate  calculation  can be done. 
ANTICIPATED  CHANGES  IN  THE  TAX  CODE 
It does not require  strong  assumptions  about  rational  expectations  to 
conclude that investors may anticipate  future changes in the tax law. 
Sometimes these changes are embodied  in legislation  already  in place. 
Such was the case in 1981,  when increases  in the generosity  of deprecia- 
tion schedules  were to take  place  in 1985  and 1986.  11  Since  existing  assets 
generally cannot be converted to the new schedules, anticipated  tax 
incentives  can represent  an implicit  tax on current  investment.  This has 
long been recognized but is not accounted for in the computation  of 
average  annual  tax rates. 
ASYMMETRIES  IN  THE  TREATMENT  OF  GAINS  AND  LOSSES 
The tax code imposes  essentially  two corporate  tax rates:  46 percent 
on positive taxable income and zero on negative taxable income. If a 
firm  incurs  a tax loss, it has two alternatives.  If sufficient  taxes were paid 
during  the previous  three  tax years, the current  tax loss may  be "carried 
back" and used to offset previous taxable income, with a resulting  tax 
refund  equal to 46 percent of the current  loss. To this extent, current 
11. Because such changes  were repealed  in 1982,  fully rational  investors  might  have 
anticipated  this in 1981  and  expected  no change  to occur  in 1985  and 1986. Alan J. Auerbach  461 
losses do receive the same treatment  as gains. If, however, the current 
loss exceeds the previous  three  years' taxable  income, the excess must 
be "carried  forward,"  with  the hope that  future  income  will be sufficient 
to absorb  it. Since losses carried  forward  do not accrue interest, they 
decline in present value at the nominal interest rate. The current 
limitation  to carrying  forward is fifteen years, increased from seven 
years  by the 1981  act. 
This  feature  of the tax code affects  new investment  in two ways. First, 
firms currently carrying losses  forward face a different pattern of 
expected  deductions,  credits,  and  taxable  income  than  do firms  currently 
taxable. Second, even taxable  firms  face the possibility  of being nontax- 
able, and therefore losing the value of tax deductions, at some future 
date. 
The motivation  behind  this  feature  of the law may  in  part  be protection 
against  fraudulent  losses produced  by fictitious  companies  and  "hobby" 
losses in which consumption expenditures are characterized  by the 
taxpayer as business expenses. That the absence of tax deductibility 
was perceived as a problem  for legitimate  businesses became evident 
when the 1981 act included a provision making it easier for firms to 
transfer  tax benefits to other firms through  the guise of leasing. The 
complicated  impact  of the asymmetry  of the taxes on losses and gains 
cannot  be captured  by aggregate  average  tax rates. Different  firms  could 
face enormously  different  marginal  tax rates  on the same  new investment 
because of differences  in their current  or anticipated  status  with regard 
to taxable  income. 
RISK 
Average  tax rates  for  the  corporate  sector  are  calculated  by comparing 
taxes to earnings, but these may have different risk characteristics. 
Corporate  earnings are extremely volatile, while depreciation  allow- 
ances are known with a fair amount of certainty, at least in nominal 
terms.  The extent to which  measured  ex post tax rates  accurately  reflect 
the real  burden  imposed  by the tax system ex ante has been the subject 
of much  recent  discussion. 
In the remaining  sections of this paper  I explore the impact  of these 
factors. I begin by temporarily  setting  aside the questions of tax losses 
and risk and consider  what has happened  over the past thirty years to 462  Brookings Papers  on Economic  Activity,  2:1983 
the marginal  tax rates for corporations  on equity-financed  investments 
in several classes of assets. The results  enable  one to compute  not only 
aggregate  marginal  tax rates  but also those faced by different  industries. 
The differing  incentives faced by these industries  to invest in various 
assets result in a production  distortion, which is estimated using the 
calculated  tax-rate  series. 
In succeeding  sections, I analyze  how these basic results  are affected 
by a more realistic  treatment  of risk and the asymmetric  tax treatment 
of gains and losses and how, in the presence of personal  taxes and the 
corporate financial  decision, inflation  affects the incentive to invest. 
Finally,  an estimate  is made  of the extent to which  accelerated  deprecia- 
tion has led to a reduction in the market value of corporate capital, 
relative  to its replacement  cost, as a result  of the deferred  taxes faced by 
older assets. This phenomenon  is important  not only when interpreting 
trends  in corporate  tax receipts  but also in the evaluation  of tax reform 
proposals  that  would alter  the relative  treatment  of old and  new assets. 
Measuring Effective Tax Rates on Corporate Capital 
In this section the focus is on the problem  of determining  marginal  tax 
rates on prospective investments.  The procedure  is to use information 
on the actual composition of business fixed investment in the United 
States, estimated  economic depreciation  rates, and the tax law in each 
year, to derive the effective tax rates  faced by individual  investments  in 
each year. These can then be aggregated  to obtain  overall effective tax 
rates. Because the focus is on fixed capital, the problem  posed by the 
existence of  noncapital income on corporate returns is eliminated. 
Because each vintage  of assets is considered  independently,  the problem 
of aggregating  vintage  does not occur. The calculations  assume that the 
relative price of  capital goods and the tax rate are constant. The 
assumption  that future tax changes are zero or are not anticipated  has 
been  the standard  assumption  in  many  related  studies,  so the  calculations 
here are comparable  to those of others.  12 
12. Studies that have calculated  effective tax rates using this methodology  include 
Charles  Hulten  and  James  Robertson,  "Corporate  Tax Policy  and  Economic  Growth:  An 
Analysis  of the 1981  and 1982  Tax Acts" (Washington,  D.C.: Urban  Institute,  1982),  and 
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The basic formula  used in these calculations  is the well-known  Hall- 
Jorgenson  user cost of capital, which gives the cost of a unit of capital 
services (under  the assumption  that  the tax law will remain  fixed)  as: 
(1)  c =  q (r +  ?)(1  -  k -  uz)/(1 -  u), 
where 
q  =  relative  price  of capital  goods 
r  =  real  rate  of return  the firm  must  earn  after  corporate  taxes 
8  =  exponential  rate at which the capital  good decays 
k  =  investment tax credit 
u  =  corporate tax rate and 
z  =  present  value of depreciation  allowances  obtained  by discount- 
ing nominal  depreciation  allowances  at r + -r, the nominal  rate, 
where -w is the inflation rate. 
Equation 1 implicitly assumes the use of equity finance, for if debt 
finance  were used, r itself would  depend  on the tax rate  u because of the 
deductibility  of interest payments. If one introduces  b, the fraction  of 
the investment a firm  finances with debt, at a nominal  interest rate, i, 
and  denotes the required  nominal  return  to equity  holders  by e, it can be 
shown  that"3 
(2)  r=  bi(1 -  u) +  (1 -  b)e -  w. 
At the margin,  the firm  earns zero profits  after  tax, in present value, 
if it invests until the marginal  product  of capital  equals c. The effective 
corporate  tax rate can be defined  by asking  what rate of tax, T,  on the 
corporation's  true economic income would present the same incentive 
to invest, for a given rate r and the actual combination  of u, k, and z. 
Under  a pure  income  tax, depreciation  allowances  would  equal  economic 
depreciation,  and the investment tax credit would equal zero. Since 
economic depreciation per dollar of investment equals (1 -  8)'8, t years 
after  the asset's purchase, the present value of such allowances would 
ative Study of the U.S.,  U.K.,  Sweden and West Germany (National Bureau of Economic 
Research,  forthcoming).  The first  of these studies,  like this one, looks only at taxes at the 
corporate  level, while  the  second  also  includes  the  effects  of corporate  interest  deductibility 
and  personal  taxes. 
13. See Alan  J. Auerbach,  "Wealth  Maximization  and  the Cost  of Capital,"  Quarterly 
Journal  of Economics,  vol. 93 (August  1979),  pp. 433-46. 464  Brookings  Papers on Economic  Activity,  2:1983 
be  i/(r +  8), and hence T  would be defined implicitly by the expression 
(3)  c =  q  r  ? 
where c is defined as in equation 1. Combining 1 and 3 yields the solution 
for  , 
4)  clq -  (r +  8)  (r +  8)  (I  -  k -  uz) -  (r +  b)1-u) 
clq -  8  (r +  8)  (I  -  k -  uz) -  8 (I  -  u) 
Equation 4 is applied to historical data to determine the effective  tax 
rates  over  time.  The  data come  from various  empirical  sources  and 
assumptions. For each asset, it is assumed that the depreciation practice 
followed was the most advantageous available to the investor in the year 
of investment.  This rules out the use of straight-line depreciation  in a 
year when,  say,  double-declining  balance depreciation  was  available. 
Although there is evidence  that not all businesses  immediately switch to 
newly  provided  accelerated  depreciation  options,  incorporating such 
behavior  in the calculations  is difficult without  a more general model 
capable of explaining it. 14 The detailed assumptions,  depreciation meth- 
ods, and lifetimes are discussed  in appendix A. The asset categories are 
those  for  nonresidential  investment  used  in national income  account 
calculations.  The real economic  depreciation rate, 8, used for each asset 
category comes from calculations based on patterns of price declines in 
asset resale markets.15 
To calculate T one also needs to know the real discount rate, r, and 
the inflation rate, -r. Future values of -w needed for the calculations  of z 
are set equal in each year to those predicted from an ARIMA forecast 
14. For evidence see Terence  J. Wales, "Estimation  of an Accelerated  Depreciation 
Learning Function,"  Journal  of American  Statistical  Association,  vol.  61 (December 
1966),  pp. 995-1009;  and  Thomas  Vasquez,  "The  Effects  of the Asset Depreciation  Range 
System  on Depreciation  Practices,"  Paper  1 (U.S. Treasury,  Office  of Tax Analysis,  May 
1974). 
15. These depreciation  rates are presented in Dale W. Jorgenson  and Martin  A. 
Sullivan,  "Inflation  and  Corporate  Capital  Recovery," in Charles  R. Hulten,  ed., Depre- 
ciation,  Inflation,  and the Taxation of Income from  Capital (Washington,  D.C.:  Urban 
Institute,  1981),  pp. 171-237.  Most  of the depreciation  rates  were  originally  calculated  and 
presented  by Charles  R. Hulten  and Frank  C. Wykoff,  "The Measurement  of Economic 
Depreciation,"  in Hulten,  ed., Depreciation,  Inflation, and the Taxation of Income from 
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based on lagged values of the inflation  rate. Somewhat  arbitrarily,  r is 
set at 4 percent. 
Shown  in table  3 are  the thirty-four  asset categories  for  which  effective 
tax rates are calculated, along with their estimated  rates of economic 
depreciation.  Table 4 shows the historical series for the effective tax 
rates  for two representative  assets, industrial  equipment  and  structures, 
in addition  to the total annual  rates, derived  by weighting  according  to 
the composition  of the capital  stock. 
Table 4 clearly shows the effects of both legislated  tax changes and 
inflation.  During  the 1976-78  period,  for  example,  there  were no changes 
in the tax law. However, as inflation  declined  and  then increased,  so did 
effective tax rates. The same effect is evident between 1979  and 1980. 
The general  results are consistent  with time-series  estimates  of the type 
done by Hulten and Robertson.16 Even before 1981  the net effects of 
inflation  and the tax law had been to keep tax rates during  the 1970s, 
overall, at levels comparable  to (or lower than)  those in the mid-1960s. 
Adding  the 1950s  and the period  from 1981  to 1982  leads to an overall 
picture of declining rates, a trend that is weaker than the decline in 
revenues in table 1 but stronger  than that of the average effective tax 
rates in table 2, which are comparable  in ignoring  interest  deductibility. 
This demonstrates  the importance  of looking  at marginal  tax rates. 
The overall trend in aggregate  tax rates masks a very strong shift 
between structures  and equipment  that is typified  by the two assets in 
table 4. From 1953 through 1961 structures  were relatively favored. 
Since then, almost  all tax incentives  have been aimed  at equipment;  the 
widening  gap in effective tax rates was curbed  somewhat  in 1982,  when 
the  partial  basis adjustment  for  the investment  tax credit  was introduced. 
This also served to remove, for the most part, the negative tax rates 
enjoyed by equipment  in general. This possibility  of negative  tax rates 
merely reflects the fact that tax incentives can be so great as to lead 
investors  to require  a lower return  before tax than  after  tax. 
Effective tax rates  by industry  also have varied  substantially  over the 
years. The 1982  values for each of forty-four  corporate  industries  are 
shown in table 5. The rates range  from a maximum  of 39.4 percent  to a 
minimum  of 6.3  percent.  The  importance  of such  interindustry  distortions 
is discussed  below. 
16. Hulten  and  Robertson,  "Corporate  Tax Policy  and  Economic  Growth." 466  Brookings  Papers  on  Economic  Activity,  2:1983 




Category  Depr-eciation  corporate 
number  Asset  categoty  rate  investment 
1.  Furniture  and fixtures  11.00  2.7 
2.  Fabricated  metal products  9.17  1.7 
3.  Engines  and turbines  7.86  0.7 
4.  Tractors  16.33  1.5 
5.  Agricultural  machinery  9.71  0.2 
6.  Construction  machinery  17.22  3.3 
7.  Mining  and oil field machinery  16.50  1.2 
8.  Metalworking  machinery  12.25  3.5 
9.  Special industry  machinery  10.31  2.9 
10.  General  industrial  equipment  12.25  4.1 
11.  Office, computing,  and 
accounting  machinery  27.29  4.7 
12.  Service industry  machinery  16.50  1.8 
13.  Electrical  machinery  11.79  10.4 
14.  Trucks, buses, and trailers  25.37  11.9 
15.  Automobiles  33.33  4.8 
16.  Aircraft  18.33  1.7 
17.  Ships and boats  7.50  0.8 
18.  Railroad  equipment  6.60  1.7 
19.  Instruments  15.00  4.5 
20.  Other  equipment  15.00  1.5 
21.  Industrial  buildings  3.61  6.3 
22.  Commercial  buildings  2.47  7.3 
23.  Religious  buildings  1.88  0.0 
24.  Educational  buildings  1.88  0.0 
25.  Hospital  buildings  2.33  0.1 
26.  Other  nonfarm  buildings  4.54  0.4 
27.  Railroads  1.76  0.5 
28.  Telephone  and telegraph  facilities  3.33  2.8 
29.  Electric light and power  3.00  7.1 
30.  Gas  3.00  1.1 
31.  Other  public  utilities  4.50  0.3 
32.  Farm  2.37  0.1 
33.  Mining,  exploration,  shafts, and wells  5.63  6.1 
34.  Other  nonbuilding  facilities  2.90  0.5 
Source:  Dale  W. Jorgensen  and Martin A.  Sullivan,  "Inflation and Corporate Capital Recovery,"  in Charles R. 
Hulten,  ed.,  Depreciatiotn, ItflatiotI,  and the Taxation of Incote  from Capit(al (Washington,  D.C.:  Urban Institute, 
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Table 4.  Effective Tax Rates for Equipment and Structures, 1953-82 
Percent 
General 
industr-ial  Induistr-ial 
Year  equipment  strtuctures  All assets 
1953  64.1  55.6  58.8 
1954  61.0  52.3  55.5 
1955  58.2  50.6  53.5 
1956  59.3  51.3  54.3 
1957  60.2  51.9  55.0 
1958  60.9  52.3  55.6 
1959  59.7  51.5  54.6 
1960  60.4  52.0  55.1 
1961  58.8  51.0  53.9 
1962  40.3  49.1  43.3 
1963  41.5  49.6  44.0 
1964  27.4  47.1  37.2 
1965  26.1  45.5  35.7 
1966  27.4  45.8  36.5 
1967  49.4  46.6  45.5 
1968  37.0  51.5  43.5 
1969  41.0  52.7  45.8 
1970  53.5  52.0  49.7 
1971  53.2  51.2  49.1 
1972  16.4  51.2  32.9 
1973  14.4  50.9  31.8 
1974  18.3  51.5  33.9 
1975  24.1  52.6  37.0 
1976  26.4  53.1  35.1 
1977  21.2  52.1  32.0 
1978  23.2  52.4  33.2 
1979  19.0  50.3  30.1 
1980  22.0  50.8  31.9 
1981  -  6.8  41.7  17.7 
1982  8.4  42.1  24.6 
Source: Author's calculations  as discussed  in the text. 
The Distortionary  Impact of Differential  Corporate Taxation 
One of the impressive  facts about  the effective tax rates in table 4 is 
how much, in any given year, they vary across investments. Since the 
seminal work of Harberger,  there has been much concern about the 468  Brookings Papers  on  Economic  Activity, 2:1983 
Table 5.  Effective Tax Rates, by Industry,  1982 
Percent 
Industry  Tax 
number  Categoty  rate 
1.  Food and kindred  products  27.0 
2.  Tobacco manufactures  24.3 
3.  Textile mill products  22.8 
4.  Apparel  and other fabricated  textile products  25.3 
5.  Paper  and allied products  18.3 
6.  Printing,  publishing,  and allied industries  28.1 
7.  Chemicals  and allied products  20.1 
8.  Petroleum  and coal products  33.2 
9.  Rubber  and miscellaneous  plastic products  19.8 
10.  Leather  and leather  products  27.4 
11.  Lumber  and wood products,  except furniture  25.3 
12.  Furniture  and fixtures  28.6 
13.  Stone, clay, and glass products  24.6 
14.  Primary  metal industries  26.0 
15.  Fabricated  metal industries  23.3 
16.  Machinery  except electrical  24.6 
17.  Electrical  machinery,  equipment,  and supplies  24.7 
18.  Transportation  equipment,  except motor  vehicles and ordnance  30.4 
19.  Motor  vehicles, and motor  vehicle equipment  21.3 
20.  Professional  photographic  equipment  and watches  27.0 
21.  Miscellaneous  manufacturing  industries  25.8 
22.  Agricultural  production  16.8 
23.  Agricultural  services, horticultural  services, forestry  and fisheries  14.7 
24.  Metal mining  34.3 
25.  Coal mining  19.1 
26.  Crude  petroleum  and natural  gas extraction  32.2 
27.  Nonmetallic  mining  and quarrying,  except fuel  15.6 
28.  Construction  13.1 
29.  Railroads  and railway  express service  21.4 
30.  Street railway,  bus lines, and taxicab service  10.0 
31.  Trucking  service, warehousing,  and storage  14.7 
32.  Water  transportation  6.3 
33.  Air transportation  11.5 
34.  Pipelines,  except natural  gas  22.9 
35.  Services incidental  to transportation  17.1 
36.  Telephone, telegraph,  and miscellaneous  communication  services  19.7 
37.  Radio  broadcasting  and television  25.8 
38.  Electric  utilities  25.0 
39.  Gas utilities  20.0 
40.  Water  supply, sanitary  services, and other utilities  39.4 
41.  Wholesale  trade  18.7 
42.  Retail  trade  27.5 
43.  Finance, insurance,  and real estate  37.3 
44.  Services  23.9 
Source:  Author's calculations.  Tax rates for other years are available from the author upon request. Alan J. Auerbach  469 
losses caused by the misallocation  of capital  between the corporate  and 
noncorporate  sectors, particularly  housing.  17 Relatively less emphasis 
has been placed until recently on the massive distortions  across indus- 
tries, and within any given industry in the corporate sector. In part 
because of the complex way in which personal taxes interact with 
corporate  taxes (discussed below), it is not clear that corporate  invest- 
ment faces a substantially  higher overall tax rate than noncorporate 
investment. Thus distortions within the corporate sector may be as 
important  as distortions between that sector and other sectors, and 
reform  of the corporate  tax should  recognize  this. 
Little empirical  work has been done on the losses due to differential 
taxation  within  the corporate  sector. This is not surprising,  given that  it 
would require  knowledge  of elasticities of substitution  among  different 
types of capital  and  labor  in  production  in  each corporate  industry,  about 
which there is very little evidence. To provide some insight into this 
question, therefore,  I examine the losses imposed  by the corporate  tax 
under  what  have  come to be fairly  standard  "baseline"  assumptions:  that 
each industry  has a production  function that is Cobb-Douglas  in each 
type of capital  used and  labor,  and  that  capital  is allocated  so as to equate 
the real after-tax return across investments. This latter assumption 
makes it appropriate  to regard the losses as long run. Under these 
assumptions it is possible to derive an analytic expression for and 
compute  the loss; in particular,  for the vector of outputs  being  produced 
by the corporate sector, one can calculate how much of the existing 
capital  stock could  be disposed  of if the remaining  capital  were allocated 
optimally. 
The analytic expression for this measure of the welfare cost  of 
differential  corporate  taxation  is derived  in appendix  B. It contains  two 
components, each of which is nonnegative.  The first, which expresses 
the distortion  due to differential  taxation  within  industries,  is zero only 
when there  is uniform  taxation  within  each industry.  The second, which 
expresses the distortion  due to differential  taxation  between  industries, 
is zero only when the weighted  geometric  means  of the before-tax  rates 
of return  in each industry  are the same. The measure derived here is 
17. Arnold  C. Harberger,  "Efficiency  Effects of Taxes on Income  from  Capital,"  in 
Marian Krzyzaniak, ed., Effects of the Corporation Income  Tax (Wayne State University 
Press, 1966),  pp. 107-17. 470  Brookings Papers  on Economic  Activity, 2:1983 
related  to that obtained  by Gravelle,  who also used the Cobb-Douglas 
assumption  but aggregated  the corporate  sector into a single  industry.  18 
When  this technique  is used to determine  the asset-specific  effective 
tax rates, it yields the series in table  6 for the fraction  of the capital  stock 
effectively wasted under  the long-run  allocation  of capital  according  to 
the effective tax rates  prevailing  in a given year. 
These  distortions  show  no downward  trend,  despite  the steady  decline 
in corporate tax collections. On the contrary, the overall loss  has 
exceeded 1.54 percent  since 1972,  whereas  it was never as high  before. 
The two components of the total distortion have generally moved 
together,  with the "within"  component  accounting  for about  four-fifths 
of the distortion.  Major  increases  in the degree  of distortion  occurred  in 
1964, with the repeal of the Long Amendment,  and in 1971, with the 
introduction  of the Asset Depreciation  Range. A smaller  increase was 
associated  with  the 1981  legislation,  while  the  basis adjustment  instituted 
in 1982  substantially  lowered the estimated  distortion.  The 1981  distor- 
tion implies, for instance, that 3.19 percent of the 1981  net corporate 
capital  stock of 2.05 trillion  dollars  was being  wasted in that  year.  19  At a 
before-tax  return  of 8 percent, this would mean  a loss of over $5 billion 
in 1981. It should be emphasized  that this measure does not take into 
account  the change  in mix  of outputs  within  the corporate  sector and  the 
relative  levels of production  in the corporate  and noncorporate  sectors 
that could be expected to flow from the tax inequalities.  Such changes 
would  increase  the welfare  loss. 
Tax Losses under the Corporate Tax 
Over the years, as depreciation  schedules have become more accel- 
erated,  more  firms  have  found  themselves  without  taxable  income  against 
18. Jane G.  Gravelle, "The Social Cost of Nonneutral  Taxation: Estimates for 
Nonresidential  Capital,"  in Hulten,  ed.,  Depreciation,  Inflation,  and  the  Taxation of 
Income  from Capital,  pp. 239-50. Her measure  also differs  in the use of a Cobb-Douglas 
function  for gross rather  than  net output.  Although  the former  approach  may  be concep- 
tually  more  appealing,  only the latter  allows a closed-form  solution  in the multi-industry 
case. This difference  helps explain why the estimate of excess burden  in this paper  is 
somewhat  higher  for 1981:  the elasticity of substitution  is higher  when the net Cobb- 
Douglas  function  is used. 
19. John  C. Musgrave,  "Fixed Reproducible  Tangible  Wealth  in the United  States," 
Survey of Current Business,  vol. 62 (October 1982), pp. 33-38. Alan J. Auerbach  471 
Table 6.  The Welfare Cost of Differential Corporate Taxation, 1953-82 
Percent of capital stock 
Distortion  Distortion 
within  between  Total 
Year  industries  industries  distortion 
1953  0.59  0.13  0.72 
1954  0.53  0.11  0.64 
1955  0.37  0.07  0.45 
1956  0.43  0.09  0.52 
1957  0.48  0.10  0.58 
1958  0.51  0.11  0.62 
1959  0.45  0.09  0.54 
1960  0.49  0.10  0.59 
1961  0.40  0.08  0.48 
1962  0.45  0.12  0.57 
1963  0.41  0.11  0.52 
1964  1.11  0.29  1.40 
1965  1.01  0.26  1.27 
1966  0.94  0.24  1.18 
1967  0.25  0.04  0.29 
1968  0.82  0.21  1.03 
1969  0.62  0.16  0.78 
1970  0.27  0.05  0.33 
1971  0.27  0.05  0.32 
1972  2.95  0.69  3.64 
1973  3.17  0.74  3.90 
1974  2.74  0.64  3.38 
1975  2.18  0.50  2.69 
1976  2.13  0.57  2.70 
1977  2.69  0.71  3.40 
1978  2.40  0.64  3.04 
1979  2.52  0.67  3.19 
1980  2.23  0.59  2.83 
1981  2.64  0.55  3.19 
1982  1.29  0.25  1.54 
Source:  Author's calculations  as described  in appendix  B. 
which  to claim  deductions.  This  is easy to understand.  Under  the current 
tax law, an investor  purchasing  an asset in the five-year  capital  recovery 
class receives an immediate  deduction  of 15  percent, a deduction  of 22 
percent  after one year (both on a basis equal to 95 percent of purchase 
price), and an immediate  investment tax credit. Gross receipts in the 
first  year of at least 56.9 cents per invested dollar,  that is, (15 + 22) x 
0.95 +  10/0.46, would be required  to absorb these tax benefits, even 472  Brookings Papers  on Economic  Activity,  2:1983 
without  accounting  for the fact that investment  credits cannot be used 
to offset all taxable income. Firms  without  substantial  existing sources 
of income and  fast-growing  firms  are likely to have to carry  losses back 
or forward.  Carrying  losses forward,  however, essentially offsets the 
benefits  of accelerated  depreciation.  This problem  provided  an impetus 
for the introduction  of "safe-harbor"  leasing  under  the 1981  tax act. To 
understand  why this process was structured  as it was and also why it 
was so  unpopular, it helps to review why the current tax system 
discriminates  against  tax losses. 
Aside from the enforcement  problems  mentioned  above, the lack of 
a loss offset in the tax system possibly derives in part  from  a perception 
among  policymakers  that losing firms  are  just that: "losers." For some 
reasons, the stockholders of such firms are unable to replace poor 
management  or, for some other  reason, the helping  hand  of government 
is necessary to discourage  such firms.  The benefit  of having  carry-back 
and carry-forward  provisions, so this argument  continues, is that suc- 
cessful, risk-taking  firms with an occasional "bad draw" would lose 
little or nothing, while those with more permanent  problems would 
benefit  less from  these provisions. 
Aside from  the questionable  economic  merit  in discriminating  among 
firms by the state of their income, there are at least two additional 
problems with this approach. First, even if "losers" are initially dis- 
couraged  from  investing  because  of the  prospect  of nonrefundable  losses, 
once these losses have occurred, the desire to use them up through 
carrying  forward  may offer an increased  incentive  to invest in the future 
in order to generate higher  expected taxable income. Second, under  a 
tax that does not have economic income as its base, there need be no 
systematic relation  between a firm's  taxable income and its underlying 
profitability.  Indeed,  under  accelerated  depreciation  it is the firms  whose 
capital  stocks are growing  fast that  face the severest problem.20 
''SAFE-HARBOR  LEASING  AS  A  SOLUTION 
For years before 1981, leasing was recognized as a method for 
transferring  tax benefits  among  firms.  That  many  airlines  leased some or 
20. These issues are explored  more  fully in Alan  J. Auerbach,  "The  Dynamic  Effects 
of Tax  Law  Asymmetries,"  Working  Paper  1152  (National  Bureau  of Economic  Research, 
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all of their  planes  from  financial  institutions  was well known. By making 
payments to the lessor over the period of the lease timed to coincide 
better  with the income  from  the project,  the lessee could  obtain  a greater 
part  of the value of the tax benefits, which would be transferred  by the 
lessor in the form  of reduced  lease payments. 
But leasing could only be used for certain assets, essentially those 
that  could be used by a firm  other  than  the lessee at the expiration  of the 
lease: planes, but not dies used to make cars of a particular  model. 
Moreover,  there  were other  provisions  that  prohibited  lessee finance  or 
a fixed repurchase  price option and required  a "reasonable"  profit  for 
the lessor before tax, which made  leases imperfect  as a transfer  mecha- 
nism. 
Most of these hindrances  were removed  in 1981,  and the result  was a 
spate of "wash leases" under which cash changed hands only at the 
initiation  of a lease, and the title to the asset in question never left the 
possession of the user. In this arrangement,  the purchaser  of the tax 
benefits  (the lessor) received the investment  tax credit  and  depreciation 
deductions  in exchange  for this initial "down payment," plus a stream 
of future tax liabilities. The transaction  involved a paper loan by the 
lessee to make  up the difference  between  the down  payment  and  the full 
price  of the asset. The tax obligations  of the lessor reflected  the fact that 
the  paper  lease payments  received  exceeded the  paper  interest  payments 
by an amount  equal to the principal  repayments  made to the lessee. In 
addition  to the down payment, the lessee received a stream  of future 
decreases in tax liability  mirroring  those of the lessor.21 
Safe-harbor  leasing  was criticized  and scheduled  under  the tax act of 
1982  for repeal  after 1983,  to be replaced  by yet another  type of leasing 
that is referred to in the legislation as finance leasing. From initial 
inspection,  finance  leasing  appears  to be a hybrid  of safe-harbor  leasing 
and  the pre-1981  leasing, often referred  to as leveraged  leasing.22  Much 
of the criticism took the form of declamations against "welfare for 
corporations," reflecting  in part news stories relating  the success of 
firms  like General  Electric  Company  in using  leases to offset its current 
21. Leasing  is described  more fully and a sample  wash lease outlined  in Auerbach, 
"The  New Economics  of Accelerated  Depreciation." 
22. The 1982  changes  are  discussed  and  analyzed  in Alvin C. Warren,  Jr., and  Alan  J. 
Auerbach,  "Tax Policy and Equipment  Leasing  after  TEFRA," Harvard  Law Review, 
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income tax liability  as well as those of previous years (through  a carry- 
back) and Occidental  Petroleum  Corporation's  use of leasing to enable 
it to use foreign tax credits that otherwise would have expired. But 
perhaps  the more  fundamental  problem  with leasing was that it did not 
appropriately  discriminate  among  investors. 
To understand  this problem,  it is helpful  to define  three  extreme  types 
of investor:  the company  with  taxable  profits  now and  for the forseeable 
future (the taxable company), the company with a substantial  current 
tax loss being  carried  forward  and  little prospect  for being  taxable  in the 
future (the tax-exempt  company), and the company  undertaking  large 
initial investments that generate large current  deductions and credits 
that cannot  be used, but with the prospect  of taxable  income in the near 
future (the start-up  company).23  First, consider the case in which no 
deductions  are generated  by the use of debt finance. 
Under the Accelerated  Cost Recovery System, the taxable investor 
purchasing an asset in the five-year capital recovery class in  1981 
obtained, in effect, a negative tax rate on that asset: as shown in table 
4,  the present value of the investment tax credit and depreciation 
allowances  from  that  cost recovery system slightly  exceeded those that 
would have been available  if immediate  expensing  were allowed  for tax 
purposes. For the start-up  firm, however, this was not the case. By 
having  to carry  forward  unused credits and deductions, the benefits of 
acceleration were lost. By engaging  in a lease, the start-up  company 
could receive the full benefits, through  the immediate  down payment 
and the future tax deductions, timed to occur after the company had 
become taxable. But tax-exempt  firms  could engage in leases, too, and 
did so. Because such firms  were facing roughly  the same incentives to 
invest as the taxable firms, the receipt of the initial down payment 
appeared to  provide them with a  substantial benefit. Given down 
payments under five-year leases in the neighborhood  of 20 cents per 
dollar  of investment,  this was an important  issue. 
Once debt finance is taken into account, however, these results are 
altered.  In particular,  the tax-exempt  firms  face the additional  disadvan- 
tage of not being able to deduct interest payments. Calculations  by 
Warren  and  Auerbach  suggest  that,  for firms  using  all debt  finance  at the 
23. The following discussion draws on the arguments  in Alvin C. Warren,  Jr., and 
Alan J. Auerbach, "Transferability  of Tax Incentives and the Fiction of Safe Harbor 
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margin, leasing as structured under the  1981 act would have been 
inadequate to reduce the user cost of capital to that of the taxable 
corporation.24 
THE  IMPACT  OF  LOSSES  ON  THE  INCENTIVE  TO  INVEST 
These taxable, start-up, and tax-exempt companies are extreme 
cases that exist only in papers such as this. In reality, each firm  has a 
finite  probability  of being  taxable  in a particular  year in the future,  given 
its current  and past experience. The discussion in this section seeks to 
determine  how large an effect this has on the incentive to invest. The 
basic approach  involves observing  individual  firms  over time and esti- 
mating  the probabilities  of whether  a firm  will be taxable  in a given year 
based on the experience  of previous  years, assuming  the firm  optimizes 
subject  to a particular  tax system. With  such estimates, one can obtain 
the expected present  value of taxes the firm  will pay in connection  with 
a new investment  project,  by translating  the  accrued  tax  liability  (positive 
or negative)  that  the project  generates  in each year into a distribution  of 
dates over which those taxes actually will be paid. Because I limit 
consideration  to marginal  projects that are assumed not to affect the 
firm's probabilities  of being in a particular  taxable position in a given 
year, this is a straightforward  calculation.  The calculations  are  based  on 
observations of the tax loss carried  forward  by individual  firms over 
time, inasmuch  as data  on annual  accrued  tax liabilities  are  not currently 
available. 
Under current  tax law, a firm with a tax loss may obtain a refund 
for this loss and hence be taxed as if there were a full-loss offset at the 
margin  if the nominal  value of its previous  three years' taxable income 
is at  least as large.  Such  losses are  said  to be carried  back  against  previous 
income. A firm  that  has insufficient  potential  for carrying  back can only 
carry  excess current  losses forward,  in the hope that its nominal  value 
can be offset against  future  taxable  income. Losses can now be carried 
forward  for as many as fifteen years; before 1981 they expired after 
seven years. 
One may think  of current  taxable profits  in a symmetric  way. If, for 
example, the firm  has a larger  loss carried  forward  from  previous  years, 
the profits  are set against  the loss carried  forward;  the firm  pays no taxes 
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and  carries  forward  any remaining  loss to the next year. If the firm  has a 
potential  for loss carry-back  in the form of previously  taxed income, it 
pays taxes on its current  income and adds it to the potential  carry-back 
that  it has available  in the following  year. 
One may summarize  the firm's current  tax status by a continuous 
variable,  yt, equal to the real value of its tax loss carry-forward  at the 
end of year t when positive and, in absolute value, equal to the firm's 
potential  loss carry-back  when negative.  Whether  increments  to a given 
year's tax liabilities  are paid  in year t or some later  year depends  on the 
sign  ofyt. If  yt  is negative,  whatever  additional  taxes (positive  or negative) 
the firm  owes are paid  in year t. If yt  is positive, the firm  neither  receives 
additional  benefits nor pays incremental  taxes at the margin  in year t. 
The additional  liability  (perhaps  negative)  is added  to the previous  loss 
carry-forward  and is to be paid (in fixed nominal terms) in the first 
subsequent  year when yt is negative. To calculate  the expected present 
value of a particular  dated tax liability one must therefore know the 
joint distribution  of yt and its past and  future  values. 
The modeling  of yt is complicated  because its relation  to its own past 
values depends both on the tax law and the characteristics  of the firm. 
One  would  expect substantial  serial  correlation  in  yt because  the current 
year's taxable  income or loss is likely to be small  relative  to the stock of 
losses carried forward or gains available for a potential carry-back. 
However, y would tend to decay even with a zero current  tax liability, 
for two reasons. First, since an unused  carry-forward  (or carry-back)  is 
a nominal  claim, its real value decays at the rate  of inflation.  Moreover, 
the expiration of carry-forwards  and potential carry-backs  imparts  a 
further,  vintage-related  decay of y. 
To the extent that a firm would normally expect positive taxable 
income in a given year, this will tend to lead over time to negative  yt. 
The evolution  of yt, starting  at any initial  value, depends  not only on the 
tax law (with respect to depreciation  allowances  and so on) but also on 
the firm's  overall level of profitability  and the stochastic  process gener- 
ating  its annual  returns.  Firms  facing  a loss carry-forward  may  alter  their 
behavior  to influence  y because the accrual  of losses over time without 
interest  provides  an incentive  to "use them  up."25 
Because even a simple specification  of the evolution of y leads to a 
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fairly  complicated  procedure  for the derivation  of the conditional  prob- 
abilities  needed for these calculations,  I assume that all the effects  just 
mentioned  can be summarized  by the first-order  process, 
(5)  yt  -`a  +  13Yt-1I  +  et, 
where  the tax loss carry-forward,  yt, is divided  by a measure  of the firm's 
assets to correct for potential heteroscedasticity.  I use the estimated 
variance  of Et  along  with  the estimates  of ax  and  a to generate  distributions 
for yt, conditional  on its past value, under  the assumption  of normality. 
Using the estimated  distribution  of yt  conditional  on yt- l, that  of yt_  I  on 
Yt-2, and so forth, I can then generate  the conditional  probability  that  yt 
exceeds  zero,  given  information  on  whether  each  of  Yt-1,  Yt-2, . . . 
exceeded zero. The distribution  of actual  tax payments  deriving  from a 
tax liability, Tt, dated year t then equals tpo x  T, in year t, ,+ I  Plo  x  T, 
(1 -  TTt+  1)  in year  t  +  1, t+2P 10  X  TO(1(1  -  Trt+2)  in year  t  +  2, 
and so on, where tpo  is the unconditional  probability  of being  taxable  in 
year t, art  is the inflation  rate in year t, and t+ipl ...lo  is the probability 
that yt+i < 0, conditional ony, Yt,+i, . .,  .+i-l  >  0. With a perfect loss 
offset, tpo  would equal 1, and the remaining  probabilities  would equal 
zero. Calculation  of the time it takes for the probabilities  po,  Plo,.  . . to 
converge to zero provides an estimate of how long a firm  with a loss 
takes to pay its accrued  taxes. 
To estimate  equation  5, I used the Compustat  data  file derived  from  a 
panel of large American  corporations.  The version of Compustat  used 
contains data from 1959  to 1978. It is unfortunate  that the variable  y, 
which is defined  here to be the tax loss carry-forward  when positive and 
the potential carry-back  when negative, is observed only when it is 
positive. That is, Compustat  contains an annual  observation  for each 
firm  on the tax loss carry-forward  but nothing  on the potential carry- 
back. Construction  of such a number  would require  information  on the 
previous three years' taxable income, which is unavailable.  Thus for 
many observations yt, yt- l, or both, are missing. 
To obtain  consistent estimates  of ax  and 1, the following  technique  is 
adopted. All observations  for which yt- I is observed are selected and, 
using a standard  Tobit procedure, equation  5 is estimated. From this, 
one can  obtain  predicted  values  of yt  for all  these observations,  including 
those for which the actual value is not available. Adding  observations 
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explanatory  variable, I reestimated  equation  5.26 For the first stage of 
the estimation  1,750  observations  were available  for 1959-77, with most 
occurring  in the latter  part  of the sample.  By the method  just described, 
another 317 observations were added for the second stage of  the 
estimation.  The resulting  equation  iS27 
(6)  y=  -  0.063  +  0.729yti 
(0.009)  (0.023) 
Standard  error  of estimate = 0.348, 
where standard  errors are in parentheses, and yt (when positive and 
observed)  equals  the firm's  tax loss carry-forward  divided  by a corrected 
measure  of its net capital stock.28  The coefficients  oa  and a  conform  to 
prior expectations that the former should be negative and the latter 
between zero and 1. This combination  yields a long-run  value of yt that 
is negative  and the decay of shocks away from  it. The long-run  value of 
y, implied  by 6 is - 0.232;  the  typical  firm  would  have  available  a potential 
carry-back  equal  to 23.2 percent  of its net capital  stock. Given  observed 
before-tax  rates of return,  this represents  approximately  two years of 
profit,  a reasonable  figure. 
This long-run value, however, is simply the mean of a long-run 
distribution  of yt.  It is the value  to which  yt would  converge  in  the absence 
of shocks of above-average  losses or gains. In fact, there  will be a long- 
run  probability  distribution  for yt around  this value that depends  on the 
magnitude  of these shocks. By assuming  that the annual  random  shock 
to y, is normally distributed,  with a standard  deviation equal to the 
standard  error  of estimate  in 6, one can  calculate  the long-run  probability 
distribution  for  yt.  Using  this  long-run  distribution,  one can  then  calculate 
26. The argument  for doing so is that otherwise  ox  and ,B  will be derived  only from 
observations  for which  y,  is positive. Any asymmetry  in the equation  connected  with 
the sign of y,  would not be discernible.  In fact, this two-stage  procedure,  in principle, 
allows estimation  of individual  values of ox  and ,B  depending  on the sign of y,  . Such an 
experiment  proved  unsuccessful,  however,  because  the coefficients  for negative  values  of 
y,  were estimated  with  insufficient  precision. 
27. Because the two stages were estimated  separately,  these standard  errors  lack  the 
adjustment  necessary to account for the fact that some values of Y,-l are estimated. 
However,  given  that  such  observations  are  a small  part  of the sample,  and  that  the standard 
errors  are so small  relative  to the coefficients,  such  a correction  was not made  here. 
28. This  capital-stock  measure  was calculated  for  the  Compustat  firms  and  is described 
by Clint  Cummins,  Bronwyn  Hall, and Elizabeth  Laderman  in "The R&D Master  File: 
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Table 7.  The Persistence of Loss Carry-Forward: Estimated Long-Run 
Transition Probabilitiesa 
Number  Probability  Number  Probability 
of years  that Yt > 0  of years  that Yt  > 0 
0  0.6926  1  1  0.0033 
1  0.1041  12  0.0025 
2  0.0599  13  0.0019 
3  0.0397  14  0.0014 
4  0.0277  5  001 
5  0.0199  15  0.0011 
6  0.0144  16  0.0008 
7  0.0105  17  0.0006 
8  0.0077  18  0.0005 
9  0.0058  19  0.0003 
10  0.0044  20  0.0010 
Source:  Author's  calculations  as  described  in  the  text.  The  value  shown  for  each  year  is  the  unconditional 
probability that a representative  firm will have a tax loss carried forward for exactly  this number of successive  years. 
a.  The last probability equals the sum of all remaining values.  It is assumed in these calculations  that losses  cannot 
occur for more than twenty  successive  years. 
(using  a numerical  integration  technique)  the probabilities  po,  Plo,  Pilo, 
and so on, as defined above: the unconditional  probability  of a firm 
being  taxable  in a given year, the probability  of it being  taxable  following 
a loss carry-forward,  following  two years of loss carry-forwards,  and so 
forth. These probabilities  are presented in table 7. Even though the 
expected  long-run  value  of y, is negative,  over 30 percent  of the long-run 
distribution  of yt is positive. An important  feature  of the distribution  is 
that it predicts that a tax obligation  accrued in a given year would be 
paid, on average, 1.055  years later. 
With  these probabilities,  one can  estimate  the  effect of the asymmetric 
treatment  of losses on the incentive to invest. This is done by first 
positing a certain before-tax internal  rate of return  on an asset and an 
economic depreciation rate. With these, a time pattern of marginal 
products  for the asset can be generated.  It is assumed  that  these returns 
are  certain.  Then,  with  a hypothesized  pattern  of depreciation  allowances 
and investment  tax credits, one can calculate  the pattern  of accrued  tax 
liabilities generated by the asset over its lifetime. These are then 
converted  into an expected tax payment  pattern  using the probabilities 
in table  7 and an assumed  inflation  rate. The latter  is necessary  because 
tax liabilities  are carried  forward  in nominal  terms, and these liabilities 
decay in real terms through inflation. Finally, one can calculate the 
internal  rate  of return  for the firm's  expected after-tax  flows. Comparing 480  Br ookings  Papers  on  Economic  Activity,  2:1983 
Table 8.  Effective Tax Rates for Equipment and Structures: The Importance 
of Deferred Paymenta 
Percent 
General industrial  Industrial 
equipment  structures 
Immediate  Immediate 
Tax law and  payment  payment 
inflation rate  Po =  I  Actlial  Po =  I  Actuial 
1965 tax law 
No  inflation  13  22  38  37 
4 percent  33  37  52  47 
8 percent  48  47  58  52 
1972 tax law 
No  inflation  8  18  40  38 
4 percent  27  33  55  50 
8 percent  42  43  62  55 
1982 tax lawAy 
No  inflation  -  13  10  27  27 
4 percent  0  18  38  37 
8 percent  12  25  45  42 
Source: Author's  calculations  as described  in the text. 
a.  Tax rates  labeled po  =  I assume  that tax  payment  occurs  when  liability is accrued;  those  labeled  actual are 
based on table 7. using the method described  in the text. 
this to the assumed  before-tax  return  using  equation  4 yields, as before, 
a value for  , the effective tax rate.29 
These rates are presented in table 8 for two representative  assets, 
industrial  structures  and  general  industrial  equipment.  A before-tax  real 
return  of 6 percent is assumed, and the economic depreciation  rates 
listed in table 3 (0.0361  and  0.1225,  respectively)  are  used. Estimates  are 
given of T  for the tax laws of the mid-1960s,  of the early 1970s,  of the 
present period, and for inflation  rates of zero, 4, and 8 percent. Also 
presented are the effective tax rates, comparable  to those in table 4, 
based  on the assumption  that  taxes are  paid  when  the liability  is accrued. 
It should  be kept  in mind  that  the estimates  on which  the probabilities 
are  based  come from  a reduced-form  equation  that  would  not necessarily 
be stable over changes in tax regime or economic environment.  The 
29. These  calculations  are  based  on a fixed  before-tax  return,  rather  than  those above, 
which started  with the after-tax  return  and  generated  a before-tax  return.  The difference 
lies only in that  the overall  level at which  the two rates  are  compared  will normally  differ. 
A second point  about  X is that it implicitly  assumes  risk  neutrality  with respect  to the 
risky tax payments. This makes sense if the risk is entirely diversifiable.  Otherwise, 
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value  of Po, for example, will undoubtedly  be lower in the 1980s  because 
of the tax changes  enacted  in 1981.  Thus  estimates  of the impact  of losses 
for 1982  probably  understate  their  actual  importance.  However, one can 
view the results as illustrations  of the general magnitude  of the effect 
that  loss carry-forwards  and carry-backs  may have. 
Table  8 contains  many  interesting  results.  First,  it shows that  tax rates 
are less  sensitive to inflation once tax deferral has been taken into 
account.  Moreover,  tax deferral  lowers  effective  tax rates  for structures, 
but generally  raises them for equipment.  To understand  this, it helps to 
consider separately  the tax liabilities  generated  by gross rents and the 
benefits generated by depreciation deductions. The deferral of tax 
payments  through  losses benefits  the firm,  but  the deferral  of deductions 
hurts it. It is possible that either effect can dominate. The larger  the 
depreciation  allowances relative to gross income, the more likely it is 
that their deferral  will outweigh deferral  of tax payments  and lead to a 
net increase  in tax rates. In general,  the lower the effective tax rate, the 
more  likely it is that  deferral  will raise it. This is evident  at zero inflation 
from a comparison  of the values for the representative  equipment  and 
structure  and is reinforced by the relative impact of inflation, which 
lowers the value of depreciation  allowances  an asset receives. 
These calculations  indicate  how a typical  firm  will be affected  by the 
carry-forward  and carry-back  provisions  of the tax law in the long-run. 
In any year, however, each firm  will have a different  tax history  and, in 
the terminology  here, a different  value of y,  That firms  face the same 
incentives  in the long run  should  not be confused  with  the fact that  a firm 
with a large  loss carry-forward  faces very different  incentives than  one 
with a large potential carry-back.  To quantify  the importance  of this 
difference,  I generated  the matrices  of annual  loss probability  distribu- 
tions, one for a firm with an initial value of y, that is one standard 
deviation  below its long-run  mean (a "high-tax"  firm)  and one with an 
initial  value of y, that is one standard  deviation  above its long-run  mean 
(a "low-tax" firm). After several years the entries in each matrix 
converge  to the steady-state  probabilities  shown in table  7. In the short 
run,  however, actual  history  is very important. 
Effective  tax rates  for these firms,  comparable  to the columns  labeled 
actual in table 8, are shown in table 9. The striking  outcome in this 
table is that the firms  with higher  recent taxable  profits,  which are also 
more  likely  to be taxable  in the near  future  (the high-tax  firms)  face lower 482  Brookings Papers  on Economic  Activity,  2:1983 
Table 9.  Effective Tax Rates: The Importance of Deferred Payment, by Taxable Status 
Percent 
General  industrial  Industrial 
Tax law and  equipment  structures 
inflation  rate  Low tax  High tax  Low tax  High tax 
1965  tax law 
No inflation  17  12  37  37 
4 percent  33  30  48  48 
8 percent  47  43  53  53 
1972 tax law 
No inflation  12  7  40  38 
4 percent  28  23  52  52 
8 percent  40  35  57  57 
1982 tax law 
No  inflation  -3  -  15  27  25 
4 percent  10  -3  37  35 
8 percent  20  5  42  42 
Source: Author's  calculations  as described  in the text. 
a.  Tax  rates labeled  high tax assume  an initial value  of y,  that is one  standard deviation  below  long-run mean; 
those  labeled low tax assume  an initial value of v, that is one  standard deviation  above  mean. 
effective  tax  rates.  This  is because,  in  the  early  years  when  the  differences 
among  firms  are greatest, accelerated  depreciation  allowances  generate 
tax losses, especially for equipment.  Being tax exempt in these years is 
a hindrance,  not a help. 
Thus  the asymmetric  treatment  of gains  and  losses under  the corporate 
tax may lower or raise taxes for the average firm  and is, under recent 
and current tax law, most helpful for firms with a history of taxable 
profits. 
The Corporate Tax and Risk-Taking 
One of the fundamental  reasons for the existence of public corpora- 
tions is to allow risks to be efficiently diversified  through  the stock 
market.  Various  aspects of the corporate  tax law influence  risk-taking. 
Besides the discrimination  against tax losses  discussed above, the 
absence of indexing  in the tax law means  that uncertain  inflation  makes 
the value of depreciation deductions and nominal inventory profits 
uncertain. Uncertainties about future changes in the law themselves 
affect current  decisions. However, much of the recent discussion has Alan J. Auerbach  483 
focused on the role of the corporate  tax in sharing  the private  risks of 
corporations  by collecting more revenue  when profits  are high and less 
when  they are  low. The  existence  of this  risk-sharing  has  been  understood 
since the seminal  work of Domar  and Musgrave  and of Tobin, but the 
implications for the effective taxation of risky assets under general 
systems of taxation  have not been fully developed.30 
Suppose  assets are  risky  both  in their  gross yield (before  depreciation 
and taxes) and in the rate at which they depreciate. The current  tax 
system does not absorb a proportion  of the net yield (gross yield less 
depreciation)  but rather  a proportion  of the gross yield less a predeter- 
mined allowance for depreciation.  This has the effect of lessening the 
risk-sharing  of the tax system because fluctuations  in the net return  that 
result  from  variations  in the depreciation  rate  do not alter  the assets' tax 
liability. 
In appendix C it is shown that the effective tax rate on a risky 
investment,  defined  as before to be the rate of tax on economic income 
that would yield the same incentive to invest as the current  tax system, 
is 
(y  +  8  +  x5)(l  -  k -  uz) -  (y  +  8  +  x5)(l  -  u) 
(7)  X =_ 
(y  +  i +  x5)(l -  k -  uz) -  (8  +  x5)(l -  u) 
where the real, after-tax  return,  r, has been replaced  by the safe return, 
y; z is now calculated  using  this rate  plus the inflation  rate;  8 is expected 
economic depreciation;  and ax.  is the component  of the risk premium 
required  by investors  because of the riskiness  of economic  depreciation. 
Increases  in the riskiness  of depreciation,  through  increases  in cx^,  have 
the same effect on the firm's decisions as increases in the expected 
depreciation  rate  itself. Hence two assets that  have the same  overall  risk 
premium  in the absence of taxes, expected rate of depreciation,  and 
depreciation  allowances  will normally  face different  effective tax rates, 
with  the asset whose depreciation  provides  more  of the overall  asset risk 
being at a disadvantage.  For this asset, the proportional  tax on gross 
returns  is of less value in the sharing  of risks because  the returns  are not 
as risky. 
30. See Evsey D. Domar  and  Richard  A. Musgrave,  "Proportional  Income  Taxation 
and Risk-Taking," Quarterly Journal of Economics,  vol. 58 (May 1944), pp. 388-422;  and 
James  Tobin, "Liquidity  Preference  as Behavior  Towards  Risk," Review of Economic 
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Table 10.  Taxation and Risk: The Impact of Stochastic Returns on Effective Rates 
under the 1982 Tax Law 
Effective  tax rate 
General 
industrial  Industrial 
Capital  equipment  structlures 
risk, ot,  (percent)  (percent) 
0.00  -  21.8  45.6 
0.02  -  25.6  53.2 
0.04  -  29.7  59.0 
0.06  -  34.1  63.5 
Source:  Equation 7,  with y  =  0.02,  ir  =  0.06,  and 8 taken from table 3. Comparable values  to table 4,  with X  = 
0.04 and c8  =  0, are  -0.3  percent and 39.7 percent,  respectively. 
Although  there is much  evidence on the risk-free  rate of return,  little 
is known about the stochastic processes generating  the returns  from 
individual  assets.  Bulow and Summers pointed out that the annual 
volatility  of the stock market  was many times as great as that in gross 
corporate  earnings, suggesting  that the riskiness of asset values is the 
dominant  problem investors face.3' However, such asset risk reflects 
variations  in the discount rate applied  to earnings  as well as variations 
in the earnings  themselves. Furthermore,  such variations  do not imply 
that the specific assets owned by firms  are as risky. For example, an 
airline  that owns its fleet of planes may have a very volatile share  price 
without the depreciated  value of the planes themselves varying very 
much. Hence it is difficult  to infer from such market  observations  the 
quantitative importance of  variations in depreciation of  underlying 
assets. More empirical  work is needed on this issue for conclusions to 
be drawn. 
Nonetheless, it is useful  to observe how the introduction  of economic 
depreciation  risk  alters  conclusions  about  effective tax rates;  this is done 
for a range  of reasonable  parameter  values in table 10. The table shows 
the values of T  under  the 1982  law for an inflation  rate of wr  = 0.06, an 
assumed  after-tax,  risk-free  return  of y = 0.02, and a range  of values of 
a8 from zero to 0.06.  The effective tax rate is  calculated for two 
representative  assets, where  8 is set equal  to the previously  used values 
of 8 in table 3. To make comparisons  I set the after-tax  return  lower to 
account for the fact that this is now meant to be a risk-free  rate, and 
31. Jeremy  Bulow  and  Lawrence  Summers,  "The  Taxation  of Risky  Assets," Working 
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assume that nominal  depreciation  allowances themselves do not vary, 
so that z is calculated  using y  +  wr  as the discount rate. The range of 
values for ax.  is meant  to provide  bounds  for movements  in T. An asset 
for which ax.  = 0.06 has depreciation  so risky that an additional  after- 
tax return  of 6 percent  is required  over the risk-free  rate (in addition  to 
the risk  premium  associated  with the variability  of gross flows). 
Looking  at table 10,  one can see that  the use of a lower  after-tax  return 
in itself has an ambiguous  effect on the estimated effective tax rate, 
raising  the effective tax rate for structures  and lowering the rate for 
equipment.  As ax.  rises, the effective tax rates  diverge  for  the two classes 
of assets, with the rate  rising  for structures  and  falling  for equipment.  In 
general it can be shown that effective tax rates will increase with cxE 
unless they are negative, in which case they will become even more 
negative. This is a general result that applies for any increase in the 
effective depreciation  rate, 8  +  %x.  Intuitively,  one knows that  once tax 
benefits  are sufficiently  large  to provide  the investor  with  a subsidy,  this 
subsidy  increases in size relative  to the asset's present  value  of earnings 
as the lifetime of the asset declines. An increase in capital  risk has the 
effect of shortening an asset's life because it leads the investor to 
discount  future  flows more heavily. Thus the expectation  that effective 
tax rates increase  with capital  risk is valid  only if one rules  out negative 
tax rates  (which  would  require  a nominal  discount  rate,  y + 'r, of at least 
11  percent  for equipment). 
Interest Deductibility and Personal Taxation 
Both interest deductibility  and personal taxes have been generally 
ignored  until  now in this discussion, and  the focus has  been on tax issues 
related  to the real  rather  than  the financial  side of corporate  investment. 
For  many  questions,  however,  these features  of the tax  on capital  income 
are crucial. One of the reasons why the corporation  tax receipts have 
declined  over time  has been the increase  in nominal  interest  rates.  These 
rising  rates, combined  with the deductibility  of interest payments  and 
the relative  stability  of the aggregate  corporate  debt-equity  ratio, led to 
an increase in interest deductions. Even if this is compensated  by an 
increase in individual tax payments, there are implications for the 
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and for the viability  of the corporate  tax as an independent  vehicle for 
raising  revenues. 
Although  the corporate  tax  is obviously  relevant  to the choice between 
corporate  and noncorporate  investment,  the identity  of the entity remit- 
ting the actual  tax payment  is of little consequence to the overall  incen- 
tive to invest in capital. It is important  therefore  to understand  the total 
tax wedge between the return  to corporations  before tax and the return 
to holders  of debt  and  equity  after  tax, taking  account  of personal  as well 
as corporate  taxes. 
Discussions in this area require an understanding  of  how taxes 
influence  the corporate  decision between debt and equity finance. The 
stability of the aggregate  debt-equity  ratio at about 1:3 requires  some 
explanation,  given the apparent  tax advantage  to debt finance.32  Since 
payments  to stockholders  in the form  of dividends  are not tax deductible 
but interest payments are, there appears to be a strong incentive to 
finance  with debt. Reasons often given for the relatively  limited  use of 
debt involve both tax and nontax  factors.33 
Bankruptcy  costs are often cited as a reason  why corporations  do not 
borrow  more. A related  argument  is that  leverage  allows a firm  to lower 
the value of its existing long-term  debt through  investment decisions 
that make the firm  riskier  than had been anticipated.  This possibility  of 
"cheating"  on debt-holders  limits  the feasible extent of debt finance. 
On the tax side, there is a personal tax advantage  to equity and a 
potential corporate tax disadvantage  to debt that act to offset debt's 
apparent  tax advantage  at the corporate  level. For any taxable  investor, 
long-term capital gains receive favorable tax treatment  through  a 60 
percent exclusion and deferral  of payment  of the tax until  the gains are 
actually  realized. The capital  gains tax may be the only relevant  tax on 
equity income when marginal  equity funds come through  retentions. 
Then the customary  approach  of weighting  dividends  and capital  gains 
taxes to derive some overall personal  tax rate on equity income has no 
justification.34 
32. See Gordon  and Malkiel,  "Corporation  Finance," and  Robert  Taggart,  "Secular 
Patterns  in  the  Financing  of U.S., " in  Benjamin  Friedman,  ed., Corporate  Capital  Structure 
in the United  States (National  Bureau  of Economic  Research,  forthcoming). 
33. For a review of these theories see Roger H. Gordon,  "Interest  Rates, Inflation, 
and  Corporate  Financial  Policy," BPEA,  2:1982,  pp. 461-88. 
34. This point  is developed  in the literature.  See Mervyn  A. King, "Taxation  and  the 
Cost of Capital,"  Review  of Economic  Studies, vol. 41 (January  1974),  pp. 21-35;  Alan  J. Alan J. Auerbach  487 
When  investment  is financed  through  retention  of earnings  and  hence 
forgone dividends, stockholders postpone paying taxes on dividends 
and  the earnings  they represent.  When  the retentions  and  the additional 
earnings they generate are ultimately distributed, the dividends are 
taxed. In  this  respect, the dividend  tax is like  a consumption  tax, allowing 
deductions  for saving by the corporation  and taxing withdrawals.  The 
after-tax  rate of return  is unaffected  by the level of tax on dividends. 
Hence the net effect of such taxation  is zero on new investment  financed 
by retentions. (There  would, of course, be effects induced  by changes 
in the dividend tax rate.) The positive present value of dividend tax 
receipts  results  because the capital  currently  inside the corporation  will 
be taxed upon distribution  and because some equity funds will come 
from  the sale of new shares,  for  which  there  is no corresponding  personal 
tax saving. 
Even with the relatively small capital gains tax serving as the only 
effective individual  tax on equity income, it remains  difficult  to argue 
that very many investors would have a tax preference for equity 
financing,  given that the maximum  personal  tax rate  on interest  income 
is 50 percent, only 4 points higher  than the statutory  corporate  rate at 
which interest payments  are deducted. Moreover,  evidence from bond 
markets  suggests  that  individuals  in tax brackets  substantially  below the 
top marginal  rate can limit their tax liability by holding tax-exempt 
municipal  debt.35  Hence the potential  individual  tax gain from holding 
equity  versus debt  would  appear  to be substantially  below the corporate 
tax rate. 
Even if increased leverage does not lead to a  serious threat of 
bankruptcy,  however, it increases the probability  that the full value of 
interest deductions  themselves will not be received. Hence borrowing 
to take advantage of tax deductibility  will tend to be self-limiting.  A 
recent study using actual corporate  tax returns  for 1978  estimated  that 
under  the 1983  tax law the average marginal  tax rate at which interest 
Auerbach,  "Share  Valuation  and  Corporate  Equity  Policy,  " Journal  ofFPublic  Economics, 
vol. II (June  1979),  pp. 291-305;  and  David F. Bradford,  "The Incidence  and  Allocation 
Effects  of a Tax on Corporate  Distributions,"  Journal  of Public  Economics,  vol. 15  (April 
1981), pp. 1-22. For a detailed discussion of its implications,  see Alan J. Auerbach, 
"Taxation,  Corporate  Financial  Policy and the Cost of Capital,"  Journal  of Economic 
Literature,  vol. 21 (September  1983),  pp. 905-40. 
35. Joseph J. Cordes and Steven M. Sheffrin, "Estimating  the Tax Advantage  of 
Corporate  Debt," Journal  of Finance, vol. 38 (March  1983),  pp. 95-105. 488  Brookings Papers  on Economic  Activity, 2:1983 
payments would be deductible is 0.31 percent, not allowing for the 
possibility  of carrying  back  these deductions  or the expected value  from 
carrying  them forward.36  However, this may overstate the calculations 
based  on the transition  probabilities  in table  7. They suggest  that, with a 
nominal  discount  rate of 10  percent, a typical  firm  will receive about  92 
cents per dollar  of interest deductions, in present value, equivalent  to 
immediate  deduction at a rate of over 42 percent. Thus, assuming  an 
individual tax rate on debt of below 30 percent, there remains an 
advantage  to debt that can only be explained  by nontax  factors such as 
those mentioned  above. 
An implication  of this result  is that  firms  or individual  assets for which 
nontax borrowing  costs are small are likely to face a relatively low 
overall  effective tax rate. It has often been supposed  that  this is the case 
for structures,  as compared  to equipment.37  This would  be an important 
offset to the apparent  bias against  structures  imposed  by the corporate 
tax. However, while highly  leveraged  purchases  of apartment  buildings 
and shopping  centers by doctors and other professionals  may be com- 
mon, there has yet to be any convincing  empirical  evidence suggesting 
this is an important  effect for corporate  level investment.38  Thus  there  is 
no evidence that the results derived above concerning differential 
taxation  of assets would be qualitatively  affected by the incorporation 
of interest  deductibility  and  personal  taxes in the calculations. 
Inflation and the Effective Tax Rate 
The primary  reason why effective corporate tax rates did not fall 
appreciably  during  the 1970s  was that inflation  increased  steadily over 
36. Gordon and Malkiel, "Corporation  Finance," estimate that, before the tax 
reduction  of 198  1, the marginal  tax rate  implicit  in municipal  debt  was between  20 percent 
and  30 percent. 
37. This viewpoint is stated, for example, in Robert E. Hall, "Tax Treatment  of 
Depreciation,  Capital  Gains, and Interest  in an Inflationary  Economy," in Hulten, ed., 
Depreciation,  Inflation, and the Taxation of Income from Capital, pp. 149-66. 
38. I found no evidence using firm  panel data (which included  information  on asset 
composition)  that structures  were financed  more  heavily  with  debt than  equipment.  I did 
find,  however, that  the presence  of a tax loss carry-forward  exerted  a negative  impact  on 
leverage,  as would  be expected. See Alan  J. Auerbach,  "Real  Determinants  of Corporate 
Leverage, " in B. Friedman, ed., Corporate Capital Structure in the United States (National 
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the period. This decreased the real value of depreciation  allowances 
received  and  led to the taxation  of nominal  inventory  profits.  For capital 
purchased  by corporations,  however, the overall incentive to invest is 
affected by inflation  in three additional  ways: through  the increase in 
inflation  premiums  on debt  that  are  tax deductible,  through  the increased 
individual  taxation  of such  premiums,  and  through  the taxation  of capital 
gains  of shareholders  that  are  purely  nominal  in character.  The  aggregate 
impact  of inflation  on the effective tax on capital  has been the subject  of 
several  studies. Two of the major  studies  reached  quite  different  conclu- 
sions about the sensitivity to inflation  of the tax wedge on corporate 
source  income. 
Feldstein and Summers  estimated  the total tax wedge by combining 
a weighted  average  of estimated  marginal  tax  rates  of holders  of corporate 
securities with average tax rates at the corporate  level, and found the 
total tax rate to be very sensitive to inflation.39  For example, they 
estimated  that in 1970  there was a total effective tax rate on corporate 
source income of 76.8 percent at an inflation  rate of 5.5 percent, with 
26.6 percent of the taxes collected due to inflation.  This translates  into 
an increase of 3.3 percentage  points in the total effective tax rate per 
percentage  point increase  in the inflation  rate. 
Using  a cost-of-capital  methodology  such  as the one used in this  paper 
to account for both corporate  and individual  taxes, King and Fullerton 
found both a lower tax wedge and a much smaller sensitivity to the 
inflation  rate.40  Under  the same 1970  tax law, they estimated  that a rise 
in the inflation rate from zero to 62  percent would have raised the 
estimated  effective tax rate by 3.5 percentage  points, from  43.7 to 47.2 
percent, or 0.5 percentage point per percentage  point increase in the 
inflation  rate. 
The major  reason for the difference  in the conclusions of these two 
studies appears  to be differing  assumptions  about the marginal  tax rate 
for  individuals  and  the marginal  tax  rate  faced  by financial  intermediaries. 
Estimates  of the impact  of inflation  are particularly  sensitive to assump- 
tions  about  the marginal  tax rate  faced  by recipients  of corporate  interest 
payments.  An expression  analogous  to equation  4 can be derived  for the 
total effective tax rate, TT,  accounting  for interest deductibility  and all 
39. Feldstein and Summers, "Inflation  and the Taxation  of Capital  Income in the 
Corporate  Sector." 
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Table 11.  The Sensitivity of Effective Overall Tax Rates to Interest Deductibility 
and Inflationa 
Percent 
General industrial equipment  Industrial structures 
Inflation  Inter-  Inter- 
rate  Base  Low  mediate  High  Base  Low  mediate  High 
No  inflation  -47.6  -70.9  -54.0  -45.5  25.3  13.5  22.1  26.4 
4 percent  -11.4  -46.5  -21.1  -7.5  36.3  16.2  30.7  38.5 
8 percent  8.2  -35.3  -3.8  13.2  42.3  15.0  34.7  45.5 
Source: Author's calculations  as described  in the text. 
a.  Low  estimates  assume  b  =  0.5  and 0  =  0.2;  intermediate estimates,  b  =  0.25  and 0  =  0.2;  high estimates, 
b  =  0.25 and 0  =  0.4. 
taxes paid by the holders  of corporate  securities. The expression  is the 
same as equation  4 except that r in the second term is replaced  by the 
net return  to investors after all taxes, n, and this accounts for the fact 
that  r itself depends  on personal  income  tax rates  and corporate  interest 
deductibility. 
(8)  IT  -  (r +  8)(1 -  k -  uz) -(n  + 8)(1 -  u) 
(r +  8)(1 -  k -  uz) -  8(1 -  u) 
If investors receive a real net return  of n on both equity  and debt and 
marginal  equity  finance  is through  retentions,  it is easy to show that4' 
)  L  -  ?(1-  b)l  a  +  Lb  _  I  +  (1  -  b)l  1 ] 
where y is the accrual  equivalent  tax on capital  gains  and  0 is the personal 
tax on interest  income. 
In addition  to the effect on r, inflation  also affects the present value 
of the depreciation  allowances, z. Using 8 and 9, one can estimate the 
marginal  impact  of inflation  on TTfor  different  assets and  tax parameters. 
This is done in table 11 for the two representative  assets, industrial 
equipment  and structures,  under  the current  tax system. In all calcula- 
tions I set r =  0.04, y =  0.05, and u =  0.46, and  estimated  effective tax 
rates at different  inflation  rates under  different  assumptions  about the 
parameters  0 and b. For the sake of comparison,  calculations  based on 
the earlier assumntions  that 0 =  b =  v  =  zero  are nresented  in the 
41. See Auerbach,  "Inflation  and  the Tax Treatment  of Firm  Behavior." Alan J. Auerbach  491 
"base" column. Since r is taken as given in the calculations, the net 
return  to investors, n, varies with the rate  of inflation. 
As can be seen in table 11, the introduction  of interest  deductibility 
and personal taxes has the effect of lowering the overall effective tax 
rate on both equipment  and structures  for the low and intermediate 
cases. These are the cases in which the net impact  of the additional  tax 
features  makes the net return  n exceed r. It is in these same cases that 
an increase in inflation  raises n, given r, as the initial effect is simply 
magnified  by the increases in the nominal  interest  rate. This reduces  the 
sensitivity  of the overall tax rate to inflation.  For the intermediate  case 
in which the debt-assets ratio is set at 0.25 and the personal  tax rate at 
0.2, the effective tax rate on equipment  rises from -54.0  percent to 
-  3.8 percent, while that on structures  rises from 22.1 percent to 34.7 
percent  as inflation  increases from zero to 8 percent. The general  result 
that the tax rates faced by short-lived assets are more sensitive to 
inflation  has been documented  previously.42  Raising  the assumed per- 
sonal tax rate on interest income from 0.2 to 0.4, in line with Feldstein 
and Summers, makes both tax rates rise more rapidly. On the other 
hand, setting b =  0.5 instead of 0.25 essentially removes the effect of 
inflation  on the tax rate for structures. Since it has been argued  that 
observed debt-asset ratios may understate  marginal leverage, this may 
be a reasonable assumption to make.43  Hence it appears difficult to 
measure with great confidence the impact that inflation has on the 
effective tax rates  facing  fixed investment. 
Asset Valuation and Deferred Taxes 
Just as aggregate  revenues from the corporate  tax are often cited as 
evidence of the tax's overall impact, it is customary to measure the 
magnitude  of tax incentives for investment by the associated loss in 
annual  tax receipts. The error  involved in doing  so can be quite severe. 
For  example,  suppose  there  was a change  in  the timing  of depreciation 
allowances that accelerated their rate of receipt but compensated  for 
42. See AlanJ.  Auerbach,  "Inflation  and  the  Choice  of Asset Life,"  Journal  ofPolitical 
Economy,  vol. 87 (June  1979),  pp. 621-38. 
43. See Joseph E. Stiglitz, "Taxation,  Corporate  Financial  Policy and the Cost of 
Capital," Journal of Public Economics,  vol. 2 (February 1973), pp. 1-34. 492  Brookings Papers  on Economic  Activity,  2:1983 
this with a lower base on which the allowances  were calculated  so that 
the net impact  on the present value of these depreciation  allowances  is 
nil. There  would  be no impact  on the incentive  to invest, nor  would  there 
be any obvious reason  why the shortfall  in government  revenue  caused 
by the earlier  deduction  of depreciation  allowances  would  have an effect 
on saving: owners of assets receiving these "tax cuts" would have to 
repay  them in the future,  with interest. By assumption,  the government 
has not given them  a net increase  in resources. 
This argument  might seem to carry over directly to the case of all 
taxes: if the government,  in the long run, repays its debt, lower taxes 
today  must  be compensated  for  by higher  ones in the  future.  A significant 
difference  between taxes in general  and taxes on capital  assets is that 
future  taxes on capital  assets are immediately  capitalized.  One does not 
have to believe in Barro's altruistic  families to conclude that a pure 
change  in the timing  of such tax payments  will be neutral.44  It is not even 
necessary that the owners of such assets look beyond the present. This 
neutrality  is the result of simple arbitrage.  Assets that already have 
received a tax benefit  but now are liable  for future  "deferred  taxes" are 
less attractive  to the owner  than  comparable  new assets that  have yet to 
receive the initial  benefits. 
Consider, for example, a five-year-old  piece of equipment under 
current  law that  has no remaining  depreciation  deductions  or investment 
tax credits. For it, the value of k + uz, in the terminology  used above, is 
zero. The cash flows that it generates  in the future  will be fully taxable. 
A comparable  new asset is more attractive  (after  adjustment  for differ- 
ences in real  productivity),  because  for it the value of k + uz is not zero. 
Hence its value will be higher, by the ratio 1/(1 -  k -  uz). 
A related  reason  why old assets should  carry  a discount  is the general 
practice of introducing  investment incentives that apply only to new 
assets. The motivation  for this practice  is that increases in investment 
tax credit or acceleration of depreciation  allowances provides more 
"bang for the buck" in terms of reductions  in the cost of capital per 
dollar  of revenue lost. This is not surprising,  given that such incentives 
do not lower the effective tax rate on existing capital goods, while 
broader  changes such as corporate  rate  reductions  do. The gap between 
the taxation  of old and new assets caused  by such investment  incentives 
44. Robert J. Barro, "Are Government  Bonds Net Wealth?"  Journal of Political 
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leads to a further  discount in the value of old assets relative to new 
ones.45  A corollary is that when there is inflation, old assets will be 
discounted  because their  depreciation  allowances  are based on a lower 
price  index than  those of new assets.46 
When  older assets face higher  effective tax rates than new ones, the 
resulting  discount in their value may be considered  to be caused by an 
implicit  obligation  to the government  to pay taxes in excess of those due 
on comparable  new assets. The difference  in market  value  of the old and 
new  assets should  reflect  the  present  value  of the  obligation.  In  particular, 
the  owner  of such  an  asset could  offset this  difference  in  future  obligations 
by committing  the difference  in the value  of the two assets to government 
debt and using  the interest  payments  to cover the extra  taxes due in the 
future.  Hence the current  tax system is equivalent  to a tax that  imposes 
the same effective rate on old and new assets, combined  with a liability 
of owners of old assets to the government  equal  to the total tax-induced 
discount  on old assets under  the current  system. 
Recognizing  this point is important  because tax revenues in a given 
year  can change  for many  reasons:  a change  in the corporate  tax burden 
in general,  a change  in the relative  tax burdens  on old and  new assets, or 
a change in the timing of the collections. These have very different 
substitution  effects through  the cost of capital  and  very different  income 
effects through  changes in the value of existing assets. It is impossible 
to draw  any  general  conclusion  from  a drop  in  current  corporate  revenues 
about  whether  the incentive for corporations  to invest has increased  or 
whether potential crowding out has been increased through  a rise in 
private  wealth. 
For example, an upward  movement in the statutory  corporate  tax 
rate, combined with a further  acceleration  of depreciation  allowances 
aimed  at maintaining  the same incentive  to invest in new capital,  would 
increase  the present  value  of corporate  tax receipts  by what  is essentially 
45. This  presumes  that  old assets are  not sold  to take  advantage  of the new provisions. 
Even ignoring  transaction  costs, such behavior  would  only yield a net reduction  in taxes 
for a small  fraction  of the capital  stock, because of the tax treatment  of the sale and the 
limited  availability  of the investment  tax credit  for used assets. See Auerbach,  "Inflation 
and  the  Tax  Treatment  of Firm  Behavior,"  and  Alan  J. Auerbach  and  Laurence  Kotlikoff, 
"Investment  versus  Savings  Incentives:  The  Size of the  Bang  for  the  Buck  and  the  Potential 
for  Self-Financing  Business  Tax  Cuts," in L. H. Meyer,  ed., The  Economic  Consequences 
of Government  Deficits  (Kluwer-Nijhoff,  1983),  pp. 121-49. 
46. See Auerbach,  "Inflation  and  the Choice  of Asset Life." 494  Brookings Papers  on Economic  Activity, 2:1983 
a lump-sum  tax on existing  capital.  This  may  be thought  of as forcing  the 
owners of such capital  to assume an additional  debt to the government. 
The real effects of such a policy would be equivalent  to that of a one- 
time lump-sum  tax used to retire government  debt, a scheme without 
direct substitution  effects. Yet, as measured, this policy would quite 
possibly appear  to increase  the current  deficit,  due to the acceleration  of 
depreciation  allowances on new capital.47  It would clearly be desirable 
to have annual corporate revenues after adjustment  include changes 
in  the value  of the deferred  tax liability  of asset holders  to the  government. 
Assuming that markets capitalize future taxes, such an adjustment  is 
equivalent  to an estimate of the size of the discount  on existing capital 
due to the tax system. 
To estimate  the relation  between  the value  of an  existing  unit  of capital 
and  its replacement  cost, note that  at any time the value of the after-tax 
flows from a new unit of capital  equals its purchase  price. Normalizing 
this price to 1 yields 
(10)  I =  (I  -  u)F +  k +  uz, 
where F is the present value of the asset's before-tax  flows, and u, k, 
and z are as defined  in equation 1. For an existing capital  good of age t, 
which under  the assumption  of geometric  decay is equivalent  in terms 
of productivity to (1 -  8)t units of new capital, the value is 
(11)  v  =  (1 -  u)F(1  -  8)t  +  uzt, 
where zt is the present value of depreciation  allowances  that remain  for 
the asset. The ratio  of market  value  to replacement  cost of such an asset, 
its q value, is 
(12)  qt  V  O  --k-uz)?+  s d)t  (I  t  ectf 
This  differs  from  Tobin's  q by the assumption  that,  except  for  tax effects, 
47. An example  of this problem  of confusing  changes  in timing  and  changes  in the tax 
burden  came in the discussion  of my proposal  with Dale Jorgenson  to give investors  the 
discounted  value  of economic  depreciation  allowances  in the year  of an asset's purchase. 
See Alan  J. Auerbach  and  Dale W. Jorgenson,  "Inflation-Proof  Depreciation  of Assets," 
Harvard  Business  Review, vol. 58 (September-October  1980),  pp. 113-18.  Although  our 
original  proposal  would not have lowered  effective tax rates on capital  in the aggregate, 
some viewed it as infeasible  because  of the large  "deficits"  it would  have  produced  in the 
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old capital  is valued  at its replacement  cost. This value equals 1 when zt 
=  (1 -  8)' (k +  uz): assets  receive  tax benefits proportional to their 
productivity or physical value. This would be true under a tax on 
economic income, for then k +  uz would equal 81(r  + 8) and z' would 
equal  [81(r  + 8)](1 -  8)'.  Generally,  however,  q'  is below 1. Even without 
the intentional  acceleration  of depreciation  allowances, inflation  causes 
the present value of old allowances based on original  asset purchase 
prices to fall well short  of the value of allowances  new assets receive. 
Using equation  12,  I estimated  the values  for q'  for all vintages  of each 
of the thirty-four  asset classes from 1953 to  1982, ignoring  tax law 
changes  before 1953.  These vintage-specific  values  of q were aggregated 
into the annual asset-specific average of q under the assumption  that 
each net asset stock grew over the period  at a growth  rate  of 4 percent.48 
With the use of capital stock weights described in appendix  A, these 
were aggregated  to form a single series for the overall value of average 
q, shown in the first  column  of table 12.  The series is characterized  by a 
downward  trend. In the 1950s  the average q values actually exceeded 
unity for some assets.  With the investment tax credit, accelerated 
depreciation,  and inflation,  these values fell. Large  reductions  occurred 
with the tax changes of  1962, 1972, and 1981. The corporate rate 
reductions  in the mid-1960s  and late 1970s  had no observable impact, 
since they applied uniformly  to old and new capital. Note also that q 
increased in years when the treatment  of new capital  goods was made 
less favorable,  as occurred  with the removal  of the investment  tax credit 
in 1967  and again  in 1970. 
As suggested  above, this divergence  of average  q from 1  is essentially 
a deferred  tax liability  of holders  of existing  assets. The second column 
of table 12  shows the adjustments  to annual  revenue  that  would  be made 
if such debt were explicitly accounted for. The numbers equal each 
year's  change  in the value  of the implicit  debt,49  less real  after-tax  interest 
payments  on the stock of such debt, based on a return  of 2 percent. By 
48. This is the annual  growth  rate of the net corporate  stock of fixed nonresidential 
capital  from 1952  to 1981, based on numbers  presented  in John C. Musgrave,  "Fixed 
Capital  Stock in the United  States:  Revised  Estimates,"  Survey  of Current  Business, vol. 
61 (February  1981),  pp. 57-68; and Musgrave,  "Fixed Reproducible  Tangible  Wealth  in 
the United  States." 
49. The value of the implicit  debt for each year equals (1 -  q) multiplied  by the 
aggregate  net stock  of fixed  corporate  capital,  taken  from  Musgrave,  "Fixed  Capital  Stock 
in the United States: Revised Estimates"  and "Fixed Reproducible  Tangible  Wealth  in 
the United  States." 496  Brookings Papers  on Economic  Activity,  2:1983 
Table 12.  Average Values of q Implied by the Corporate Tax Law,  1953-82 
Implied  revenue 
adjustment 
Average  (billions  of 
Year  q (ratio)  1972  dollars) 
1953  0.921 
1954  0.898  7.6 
1955  0.908  -  2.6 
1956  0.924  -4.7 
1957  0.935  -  3.4 
1958  0.940  -  1.9 
1959  0.940  0.1 
1960  0.946  -  2.1 
1961  0.945  0.5 
1962  0.894  21.0 
1963  0.900  -  2.0 
1964  0.893  4.0 
1965  0.898  -0.4 
1966  0.899  1.9 
1967  0.927  -  12.9 
1968  0.889  22.6 
1969  0.890  1.8 
1970  0.928  -  21.8 
1971  0.926  1.9 
1972  0.867  40.1 
1973  0.864  5.1 
1974  0.865  1.9 
1975  0.867  -  1.2 
1976  0.845  17.3 
1977  0.834  10.2 
1978  0.835  1.6 
1979  0.838  0.7 
1980  0.838  2.6 
1981  0.781  60.8 
1982  0.792  n.a. 
Source:  Author's  calculations  as described  in the text. 
n.a. Not available. 
this measure, corporate  tax revenues  were really 134.6  billion  (current) 
dollars  higher  than  the amount  reported  in 1981  because  of the substantial 
increase  in the implicit  debt held by owners  of existing  capital. 
The Future of the Corporate Tax 
As a fraction  of GNP, the corporate  tax now raises less than  a third 
of what it did three decades ago. While effective marginal  tax rates on Alan J. Auerbach  497 
investment  have declined accordingly,  the distortions  of the corporate 
tax structure  have not. The calculations  in table 6 suggest a steadily 
worsening  allocation  of fixed capital  within  the U.S. corporate  sector. 
Many  other  problems  remain,  too. The  use of accelerated  depreciation 
and the investment tax credit to reduce effective tax rates have made 
the problem  of tax losses more acute. Any resemblance  between eco- 
nomic income and taxable income that existed thirty years ago has 
vanished, and many profitable  companies, particularly  those that are 
growing,  cannot use all their  tax benefits.  Though  effective tax rates  are 
lower than  they were in the 1970s,  they still are sensitive to the inflation 
rate because of the use of nominal magnitudes  in calculating  the tax 
base. Finally, the choice between debt and equity finance remains 
distorted  by the presence of two levels of taxation  of corporate  source 
income. 
Given the low level of corporate  revenues  at present,  abolition  of the 
corporate  tax has its appeal.  Such  a move would  certainly  alleviate  some 
of the problems  described  above. At the same time, however, it would 
be a singularly ineffective way of stimulating  investment because it 
would reduce  average  tax rates  much  more  than  marginal  tax rates. 
As shown in table 4, the effective corporate  tax rate on new, equity- 
financed  fixed  capital  is now below 25  percent.  Removal  of the corporate 
tax would bring  this rate  to zero but  would  also eliminate  the substantial 
benefit  of interest deductibility.  Thus it would probably  result  in a very 
small net reduction  in taxation  for new investments.  At the same time, 
repeal of the corporate tax would forgive the implicit debt owed the 
government  in deferred  taxes, currently  in excess of 20 percent of the 
fixed  corporate  capital  stock. Given  the capital  stock's 1981  replacement 
cost of $2.05 trillion,  this amounts  to a transfer  of $427  billion.50 
The continued  interest  in the consumption  tax as an alternative  to the 
individual  income tax and, indeed, the recent moves toward  such a tax 
through the sheltering of individual capital income also provide an 
argument  for removing  the corporate  tax, for capital  income would not 
be taxed under a consumption  tax. An alternative  scheme that would 
have the same marginal  impact  without  the windfalls  is a cash-flow  tax, 
discussed in detail  by the Meade Committee  in the United Kingdom  as 
a companion  for a personal  consumption  tax.5'  Like a consumption  tax, 
50. See Musgrave,  "Fixed  Reproducible  Tangible  Wealth  in the United  States." 
51.  Institute for Fiscal Studies, The Structure andReform ofDirect  Taxation (London: 
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it would amount  to a tax on the difference  between initial  assets plus 
income and final  assets in each tax period, in this case at the corporate 
level. The most straightforward  method  of accomplishing  this would be 
through  the  immediate  expensing  of gross  investment  (real  plus  financial) 
in conjunction with the continued taxation of gross income, before 
depreciation.  The chief drawback  of the cash-flow  tax, however, is that 
it does not solve the problem  of tax losses in the way that repeal  of the 
corporate  tax would. Otherwise,  the two alternatives  differ  primarily  in 
the size of the wealth  transfer  to owners of corporations. 
If the corporate  tax is not to be repealed  outright,  the problem  of tax 
losses must be addressed. Straightforward  economic solutions exist: 
unlimited  carrying  forward  with interest, for example, would maintain 
protection  against  fraudulent  loss claims  while at the same  time  preserv- 
ing the value of tax deductions  for viable enterprises. But one should 
take warning  from the recent legislative fiasco involving safe-harbor 
leasing. This is an area  of tax policy in which  common  perceptions  seem 
particularly  resistant  to economic evidence. 
APPENDIX  A 
Methodology  and 1954-82 Changes in Tax Code 
THIS APPENDIX presents the methodology  used to calculate  effective tax 
rates in the text. 
The first  step in these calculations  is to estimate  each asset's effective 
tax rate according  to equation  4. As already stated, it is assumed that 
investors  all used accelerated  methods  where  available.  Investments  are 
assumed to take place midway through  the year, with the investment 
credit  and (before 1981)  half  the first  full year's depreciation  allowances 
received immediately. Marginal  products and remaining  depreciation 
allowances  are assumed  to come at subsequent  one-year  intervals. 
The major  changes  in the tax code taken  into account  are as follows. 
1954  Introduction  of accelerated  methods;  all assets are assumed 
to use double-declining  balance  with  a switch-over  to straight- Alan J. Auerbach  499 
line methodology, instead of  the straight-line  previously 
assumed. 
1962  Introduction  of a 7 percent investment  tax credit (with full- 
basis adjustment)  and of shortened  "guideline"  lifetimes  by 
the U.S. Department  of the Treasury,  instead of Bulletin  F 
lifetimes  previously  assumed. 
1964  Repeal of basis adjustment  for investment  tax credit. A cut 
in corporate  tax rate  from  52 percent  to 50 percent. 
1965  A cut in corporate  tax rate  from  50 percent  to 48 percent. 
1967  Suspension  of investment  tax credit. 
1968  Introduction  of 10  percent  surcharge  on income  tax. 
1969  Reinstatement  of investment  tax credit. 
1970  Removal of investment tax credit, reduction  of surcharge, 
reduction of structures write-off to  150 percent declining 
balance, with switch-over  to straight-line  methodology. 
1971  Removal  of surcharge. 
1972  Shortening  of asset lives through  the asset depreciation  range 
system; reintroduction  of investment  tax credit. 
1975  Increase  of investment  tax credit  to 10  percent. 
1979  Reduction  in corporate  tax rate  from  48  percent  to 46 percent. 
1981  Economic Recovery Tax Act, as described  in the text. 
1982  Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility  Act, as described in 
text. 
The years listed are the first  for which the changes  are included.  Except 
for the 1982  act, any change was counted in the year enacted if it was 
effective before July 1 of that year. Otherwise, it was deferred  to the 
following  year.  The 1982  act became  effective  after  July 1,  but  is included 
for 1982  to allow an analysis  of its effects. 
Special tax rules apply to public utility structures and oil-drilling 
equipment.  The latter  category  is problematic  because there  are various 
depletion and write-off provisions that are difficult  to capture in the 
current  framework.  The calculations  here follow the assumptions  used 
in King  and Fullerton.52 
To convert these asset-specific rates into industry  rates, the capital 
stock matrix  also used by King and Fullerton  was adopted. This 44 x 
34 matrix  has entries equal to the estimates  for 1977  of the net stock of 
52.  King and Fullerton, eds.,  The Taxation of Income from Capital. 500  Brookings Papers  on Economic  Activity, 2:1983 
each type of the thirty-four  assets present in each of the forty-four 
industries.  This matrix  is converted to a corporate  version using esti- 
mates for each industry  of the fractions  of equipment  and structures  in 
the industry  that  are  held  by corporations.  The  capital  stocks themselves 
were derived by Fraumeni  and Jorgenson,  using data on capital flows 
and annual  levels of industry-by-industry  investment.53  Further  details 
are  provided  by King  and Fullerton. 
APPENDIX  B 
Measuring the Deadweight Loss from Differential 
Corporate Taxation 
ASSUMING  that value added in industry i can be represented by the Cobb- 
Douglas  production  function, one obtains 
(13)  Yi  =  ais  TKjxiX  i  i  =Eji, 
where Kji is the capital stock of category  j used in industry  i and Xi is 
labor  used in industry  i. With  no loss of generality,  one can define  capital 
stock units so that  the relative  price of each capital  good, qj,  equals 1. 
Consider  first the case in which capital is allocated  according  to the 
actual  costs of capital  imposed  by the market.  By the normalization  that 
qj =  1, the cost of capital type i is 
(14)  cj 
r 
+  =  p  +  8, 
where Tj  is the effective tax rate, r is the real after-tax  return  (assumed 
to be 4 percent),  and 6j  is the asset's depreciation  rate. One  may think  of 
corporate  sector allocation  as being made by a single, competitive  firm 
seeking  to maximize  profits,  where  profit  equals  gross output  (including 
depreciation)  less the cost of capital, subject  to the constraint  that the 
53. See Barbara  M. Fraumeni  and Dale W. Jorgenson,  "Capital  Formation  and U.S. 
Productivity  Growth,  1948-1976,"  in Ali Dogramaci,  ed., Productivity  Analysis:  A Range 
of Perspectives  (Martinus  Nijhoff  Publishing,  1981),  pp. 49-70. Alan J. Alierbach  501 
vector of actual outputs,  Y  (Y1, .  .  .),  be produced and the economy's 
actual stock of labor, X, be used. This yields a Lagrangian  expression 
for the actual  capital  stock, Ka, 
(15)  Ka =  max  ai  >  Kj  i  i  ?  jKji  -  cjKji) 
-  Ojiai  IKj,iXI-i  i  Yi) +  (~  x,  -X 
The first-order  conditions  from 15  may be combined  to yield 
(16)  Ka  E  _E  _J) 
where 
(17)  (~-1  v  )=  X, 
(18)  v  =  ai Trx(1-i(l  _)(h3i)- 
and 
(19)  p  - 
is the weighted  geometric  mean  of the required,  before-tax  rates  of return 
in industry  i. 
Equations 16  and 17  can be simplified.  Note that, under  competitive 
conditions,  the total supply  of labor,  X, satisfies 
(20)  I-  -  1i)  Yi 
W  i 
(where w is the competitive wage), and the technological  term, vi, also 
equals 
(21)  v=i 
One may choose the units of labor so that w  =  1, with no loss of 
generality,  and use equations  20 and 21 to reexpress 16  and 17: 
(22)  Ka  _  f  -Pi)Y *JIp 
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where 
(23)  E(p-r  1)(1 -  i)Yi = 0. 
The solution  to 23 is 4 =  1.  This  is not surprising  because  4 is the shadow 
price  of labor  (see 15), that is, the market  wage. 
The minimum  capital  stock necessary to produce Y,  holding  X fixed, 
is found  by solving the Lagrangian, 




Yj  ) ? 
yX  X  *i  ji  i  i 
Using the same solution  technique  as before, one obtains 
(25)  - =  (_ 
where 
(26)  (Y  v  ;i) Yi) =X. 
Again  using 20 and 21, 25 and 26 can be rewritten  as 
(27)  K*  = E  'i)  Pi i  pi  Yi 
where 
(28)  E  [(Ypi)-i  1](1 -  i)Yi = 0. 
The term y may be thought  of as the inverse of the weighted-average 
aggregate  cost of capital.  If Pi  were constant  across i, it would  equal 1/Y. 
Forpurposes  of exposition,  we define -=  1/  y. Subtracting  the  expression 
for K* from that for Ka yields an expression for the "wasted" capital 
stock, 
(29)  AK=  Qi (OJi)(P  -I )+  ?3 Qi[I  -  - 
where 
(30)  Qi  Yi3iPi- 
It may  be shown  that  the first  sum  on the right-hand  side of 29  achieves 
a minimum  of zero when Pi =  Pj  Vi,j, and that the second term  achieves Alan J. Auerbach  503 
a minimum  of zero when Pi  is constant over i and (by 28) equal to p. 
Hence it is natural  to interpret  these terms  as the wastage  due  to variation 
in effective tax rates  within  industries,  and  between  them, respectively. 
Dividing  equation  29 by equation  22 gives an estimate  of the  fraction  of 
the capital  stock that  is wasted, 
K_  Q3(  ~)iv  (Pvi)  ?  Q[j(Pi)]  (31)  L~  AK  Pi  i 
To solve 31, I set Pi  equal to the share of capital in value added in 
industry  i taken  from  the 1972  Census of Manufactures,  Yi  equal  to that 
valuLe  added,  and  use the 1977  capital  stock  weights  described  in  appendix 
A for (atjilpi).  Because three  of the forty-four  industries  (numbers  38, 39, 
and 40) are combined in the Census (which has forty-two industry 
categories),  I combine  these three  industries'  capital  stocks in doing  the 
calculations.  The terms  pj  come from  each year's  estimated  effective tax 
rates  by asset category. 
APPENDIX  C 
Estimating the Effective Tax Rate on Risky Assets 
THE ANALYSIS in this section uses the methodology  presented  in Alan J. 
Auerbach,  "Evaluating  the Taxation  of Risky Assets," Working  Paper 
806 (National  Bureau  of Economic Research,  November 1981). 
Suppose capital of a certain type is homogeneous and depreciates 
each year at some stochastic rate, 8, yielding  a risky cash flow, f,  per 
unit  of capital.  Assume  for  simplicity  that  8 andfarejointly  independently 
and  identically  distributed  over time with means  8 andf, respectively. 
Let i be the discount  rate  that, when applied  to the meanf, yields the 
risk-adjusted  present  value  off. Define  x similarly  for 8, and  let y denote 
the risk-free  rate. Note that  because depreciation  represents  a negative 
contribution  to the  firm's  overall  return,  the riskiness  of 8 would  normally 
lead to a risk-adjusted  discount rate, x, that is below! the risk-free  rate, 
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the normal  result  of risk  reducing  the value  of the future  expected return, 
in this case by magnifying  8. 
A simplification  is made for convenience of notation. Observe that 
any system of depreciation  allowances and investment  tax credits has 
the same value to the investor  ex ante as a scheme that  allows fractional 
economic depreciation  at rate P. With this simplification,  and because 
of the stationarity  and independence of f  and 8 over time, one may 
consider  the firm  as facing  a series of identical  one-period  decisions. The 
condition for equilibrium  is that the risk-adjusted  one-period  holding 
yield equals  the interest  rate, or 
(32)  1 +  i  I + x  I + x  +  y 
where, as before, u is the statutory  tax rate. 
To  solve for  ],  one  must know the present value of economic 
depreciation.  The value of this period's depreciation  is 8/(1 + x). The 
next period's value is the value seen from the next period  per dollar  of 
capital, also 6/(1 + x), multiplied  by the present value of capital  at the 
beginning of next period,  [1/(1 +  r)] -  [8/(1 +  x)]. Continuing in this 
way, one can obtain  the present  value of economic depreciation, 
(33)  ZE  ?  +  x  + 
+~  ~~  *  *  x  [(I-X 
+  =  ~  + 
(  +  Y( 
Thus if actual depreciation  allowances  provide  value z, and there is an 
investment  tax credit  at rate  k, one obtains 
(34)  k  uz  8+1y 
which, when substituted  into 32, yields 
1 I  k-  U  1y 
(35)1+i  1+x  y Alan J. Auerbach  505 
This can also be written 
(36)  (I1 -  k -  uz  8)  =  Y +  lf  (I  k -  uz  +  8 
where 
(37a)  o  (f=  f  (  ) 
(37b)  =  _  y  x) 
The terms (Xf  and c-8  are the risk  premiums  associated  with the riskiness 
off and  8, respectively.  At one extreme,  where  onlyfis risky,  the asset's 
annual  returns  are independent.  At the other  extreme, with only 8 risky, 
the asset's annual  return  follows a random  walk  with a drift  of - 8. 
Once again  one can define  the effective tax rate  as the particular  rate 
that would provide the same incentive to invest as the current  system. 
Because under an income tax at rate T the equilibrium  condition for 
holding  period  yield is 
(38)  f (I-T)  6(1-T)  _  y 
1i  + x  ?+  Y 
equations  36 and 37 can be combined  to solve for the effective tax rate 
analogous  to equation  4 in the text: 
(f-  Q)  -  (Y +  6  +  as) 
(39)  v 
f-  oas)  -  (  +  oas) 
(y-  ?  6 ?  cte)(1 -  k -  uz) -(y-  +  8  +  ?c)(1  -  u) 
(y +  6 ?  ca)(1 -  k -  uz) -  (6 +  ca)(1 -  u) 
The  effective tax rate  is precisely  the rate  that  would  apply  in the absence 
of risk  for a risk-free  rate,  y, and  an economic depreciation  rate, 8 + cx^. 
Hence two corrections  must be made for the effective tax rates calcu- 
lated  above:  replace  the return,  r, with  a risk-free  return  and,  as suggested 
by Bulow and Summers,  consider  economic depreciation  to be at rate  8 
+  cX. 54 
54. Bulow  and Summers,  "The  Taxation  of Risky  Assets." Comments 
and Discussion 
Henry  J. Aaron: Alan  Auerbach  has written  an  ambitious,  original,  and 
provocative paper on an important  subject. More accurately, he has 
written several mini-papers  on a variety of subjects and grouped  them 
under  a single  title. My comments  are selective. 
My first  comment  concerns  the estimates  of the capital  wastage  from 
tax-related  distortions. 
To begin at the beginning,  the corporation  income tax potentially 
causes a variety of distortions. First, it creates a tax wedge between 
corporate  and noncorporate  activity unless other tax provisions offset 
it. This is the problem  on which Harberger  wrote his classic article.' 
This distortion is reflected in a distortion  of both the composition of 
output and the methods of production. Although Harberger  did not 
analyze  them, additional  distortions  would  result  in the supply  of factors 
of production.  Second, the effective tax rate  varies among  categories  of 
capital  goods because  taxable  depreciation  differs  from  true  depreciation 
by varying  amounts  across classes of capital goods. The effective tax 
rate varies across firms both because they employ different  mixes of 
capital  goods that are variously  taxed and because they have different 
profit histories and prospects. Although Auerbach late in his paper 
estimates how variations  in profit  histories  and prospects  change  effec- 
tive rates, he does not use these estimates  in calculating  capital  wastage. 
These features of the corporation  income tax distort  factor supplies 
and  cause a misallocation  of capital  and  labor  both  between  the corporate 
and noncorporate  sectors and between various industries and firms 
within the corporate sector. Some of both kinds of misallocation is 
1. Arnold  C. Harberger,  "The Incidence  of the Corporation  Income  Tax," Journal  of 
Political Economy,  vol. 70 (June 1982), pp. 215-40. 
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attributable  to distortions  in output  arising  from price effects to which 
consumers  respond;  some is attributable  to shifts  in factor  intensities  as 
firms  respond  to factor  prices distorted  by one or another  aspect of the 
corporation  income  tax. Harberger  included  both of these distortions  in 
his analysis of the effects of the corporation  income tax on corporate 
and  noncorporate  sectors, but his analysis  was highly  aggregated. 
Auerbach omits some of these distortions in his analysis-those 
arising  from shifts in factor supplies  because of changes  in the remuner- 
ation  of labor  and  capital,  and  in output  because the corporation  income 
tax causes  shifts in relative product prices. In Harberger's terms, 
Auerbach  omits  the output  effects of differences  in the rate  of tax across 
classes of capital  goods. Because of this treatment,  some of the distor- 
tions that would show up as  changes in factor supplies or in the 
composition  of output  (if factor supplies  and the composition  of output 
were not assumed  frozen) show up in Auerbach's  model as distortions 
in factor inputs. If factor supplies could change, some shifts in the 
intertemporal  pattern  of consumption  and  in labor  supply  would occur. 
If composition of final output could change, production  would tend to 
shift  toward  those commodities  relatively  intensive  in tax-favored  types 
of capital, thus driving up prices of types of capital used relatively 
intensively in expanding  sectors-and  at least some of these types of 
capital  would  be those that  were tax-favored.  As a result,  demand  effects 
would transmute  some of the factor-use distortions  into factor-supply 
and  output  distortions. 
The remaining  distortions  arise for two reasons. Even if all output 
were produced  by one firm, the tax advantages  to one class of capital 
relative  to another  would cause a firm  to alter its mix of capital  inputs. 
Removal of those price distortions would permit the firm either to 
produce  the same output with fewer inputs or to increase output. But 
Auerbach  treats forty-four  industries,  rather  than two, and thirty-four 
types of capital,  rather  than  one. Because the technology  of production 
differs  among  firms,  tax provisions  favorable  to certain  kinds  of capital 
will cause a reallocation of capital and of labor, and output will be 
reduced.  Rather  than  calculate  the loss of output,  one can start  with the 
tax-distorted  situation  and enquire  how much  less capital  would suffice 
to produce  the observed  output  if the distortions  were removed. This is 
the question  that  Auerbach  answers. 
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distortions and on the substitutability  of factors for one another in 
production. On the size of the tax-distortions,  Auerbach's answer is 
"very  large,  indeed."  His table  4 shows  enormous  differences  in  effective 
tax rates by asset class. These differences  translate  into a 37.66 percent 
lower p for general industrial  equipment  than for industrial  buildings. 
Auerbach  assumes a Cobb-Douglas  production  function because it is 
mathematically  tractable,  not because it is descriptively  realistic. 
If one treats  the entire  corporate  sector as a single  firm  with  two types 
of capital  subject  to this  degree  of distortion  in  the required  rate  of return, 
one can calculate  either  the resulting  loss of output  or, equivalently,  the 
amount of capital wastage that such a rate-of-return  wedge would 
produce.  Assume a production  function,  X = LaEbSC, where  L is labor, 
E is equipment,  S is structures,  and  X is output, standardized  so that  no 
scalar  is necessary in the production  function.  We know that  roughly  80 
percent of net value added accrues to labor and that the value of the 
quantity  of net corporate  equipment  approximately  equals that of net 
corporate structures. Given these quantities, the implied production 
function  coefficients  are a = 0.8, b = 0.0768, and c = 0.1232. Based on 
this production  function  and the rate-of-return  advantage  of equipment 
that  Auerbach  reports  in table  4, profit  maximizing  firms  would  equalize 
the money value of equipment  and structures  in their  net capital  stocks. 
The rate-of-return  distortion  would reduce output  by 0.54 percent, or, 
equivalently,  it would  imply  capital  wastage  of 2.68 percent. 
My second comment  concerns  the assumption  of unitary  elasticity  of 
substitution.  It is worth  noting  that, as Auerbach  applies  it, the adoption 
of a Cobb-Douglas  production  function  is not equivalent  to imposing  a 
unitary  elasticity  of substitution  among  all  types of capital.  Because each 
industry  uses only a few kinds  of capital  and  the production  function  for 
each industry  is defined only over those types of capital, Auerbach's 
Cobb-Douglas  is equivalent  to assuming  a unitary  elasticity of substitu- 
tion among included capital goods and labor and a zero elasticity of 
substitution  between each excluded type of capital and each included 
type of capital  and  labor.  A poll of those assembled  here  would  probably 
elicit a modal  estimate  of the average  elasticity  of substitution  of capital 
for labor of about 0.75. We would agree that it is likely to vary across 
industries.  Had Auerbach  been able to use this value, his estimates of 
capital wastage would probably  have been smaller  than they are. But 
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types of capital  really are. We would again  agree that they would vary 
among  classes of capital  and  among  industries,  but  I am  not sure  whether 
our opinions would place a weighted mean value nearer to 1.0, the 
assumed  value  for included  capital  goods, or to zero, the assumed  value 
for comparisons involving excluded capital goods. The latter value 
would produce  no change in the mix of capital  inputs and no "within" 
distortion  (see his table  6). I have no idea how a graph  relating  "within" 
distortion  to the elasticity of substitution  among  types of capital  would 
look, except at the end points. Nor do I know what the trade-off  would 
be between "within" and "between" distortion. 
In short, I am riding  for all it is worth  the discussant's  famous  dodge, 
the plea for sensitivity  analysis. Some effort  in this direction  is essential 
because these estimates of distortion  are important,  and one needs to 
know how much confidence to place in them. To repeat, we need to 
know the consequences of different  average levels of the elasticity of 
substitution  among  types of capital  and  of dispersion  around  that  average. 
Even if we cannot  estimate  these elasticities, at least we can have some 
sense of how much  our ignorance  matters. 
My third  comment  relates  to policy implications  of the empirical  sec- 
tion of the paper. The section on the effects of incomplete  loss carry- 
backs and delayed tax savings from losses that are carried forward 
(table 8) very nicely distinguishes  the importance  of this adjustment 
under three tax laws and at three rates of inflation. But there is no 
indication  in the text accompanying  table 6 or in table 6 itself of what 
changes in the corporation  income tax, apart  from total repeal, will go 
farthest  toward  lowering  distortion.  I strongly  suspect,  for example,  that 
the idea advanced  by two Harvard  professors  (one of whom, I think,  has 
since left) for first-year  capital recovery might go a long way toward 
reducing  the wastage  of capital.  I fear, however, that  that  proposal  may 
run  afoul  of Auerbach's  analysis  showing  the unfortunate  consequences 
of incomplete  loss offsets, as first-year  capital recovery, at least for a 
while, would  drastically  increase  losses and  possibly their  dispersion  as 
well. 
Whether  Auerbach's  estimates  of capital  wastage are large  or small, 
like  beauty,  is in  the eye of the beholder.  They  certainly  seem insufficient 
to explain  the handwringing  by both  liberal  and  conservative  economists 
over the distorting  character  of present  rules for taxing  capital  income. 
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The other  is the personal  income  tax whose provisions  for taxing  capital 
income,  together  with  institutional  rigidities,  cause additional  distortions 
in the allocation  of capital. 
Robert  E. Hall: Alan Auerbach  has presented  an interesting  and imagi- 
native account of a number  of aspects of business taxation, covering 
some old ground  and quite a bit of new ground.  I would quibble  a little 
with his title. The paper is really about the taxation  of the earnings  of 
corporate  plant  and  equipment.  There  isn't  anything  about  the  interesting 
topic of taxation  of other types of corporate  earnings,  and  there  is quite 
a bit about the taxation of plant and equipment earnings under the 
personal  as well as the corporate  income tax. 
The paper  shows very effectively what a monster  the tax system has 
become, especially in the area of plant and equipment  earnings.  The 
system taxes the earnings  of structures  to subsidize  equipment.  Under 
the assumption  Auerbach  favors, the rate of subsidy on equipment  is 
about 20 percent;  the rate of tax on structures,  about 30 percent (table 
11).  The full monstrosity  of the system is not yet evident  because the tax 
rate on existing capital is well above the rate on new capital. As time 
passes, the replacement  of capital  will erode  the tax base. In later  years, 
existing  tax rates on structures  will not be enough  to pay the subsidy  on 
equipment  and  generate  current  levels of revenue.  All revenue  estimates 
agree that the net revenue from the corporate  tax will dwindle in the 
coming  years. 
The taxation  of plant  and  equipment  is like the old crude  oil equaliza- 
tion tax. Under that tax, domestic production  was taxed to subsidize 
imports.  Now structures  are taxed to subsidize  equipment. 
The deadweight burden of the unequal taxation of equipment  and 
structures  is not small. Auerbach  calculates  that the same output  could 
have been produced with 2 or 3 percent less capital if the distortion 
favoring  equipment  were eliminated  from the tax system. The forgone 
GNP is close to $10  billion  a year. 
The paper  also puts a lot of effort into understanding  the taxation  of 
corporate  income under  the personal  income tax. There are some very 
tricky issues in this area. At first, it would appear  that the taxation  of 
interest  and dividends  at rates of close to 50 percent  under  the personal 
tax would add quite a bit to the total effective tax rate on corporate 
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taxation  of dividends  under  the personal  income  tax makes  no difference 
for effective rates  on corporate  income. When  investment  is financed  by 
forgoing  dividends now, the reduced  current  tax on dividends  exactly 
makes  up for the future  tax on dividends  financed  by the return  from  the 
investment.  The only personal  taxes that matter  are the accrual  equiva- 
lent  of the capital  gains  tax and  the tax on interest  income.  On  the margin, 
Auerbach argues, investment is financed mostly by equity through 
retained  earnings,  in which case the personal  tax is  just the capital  gains 
rate of about 5 percent. Only about one-quarter  of finance is through 
debt, and  in that case the personal  tax on the interest  paid  is between 20 
and  40 percent. 
This view brings  up the murky  issue of why firms  pay dividends.  The 
same firm  contemplating  cutting  dividends  to finance  investment  might 
just as well think about cutting dividends  to retire  debt or buy its own 
shares. Both unambiguously  raise the value of the firm. The firm  that 
was free to cut its dividend  would  easily find  a reason  to cut the dividend 
to zero. 
A view with  very different  implications  is that  firms  are  precommitted 
to a certain  growth  path  of dividends.  Firms  then  decide  between  putting 
retained  earnings  into  plant  and  equipment  or into  bonds. On  the margin, 
all  investment  is financed  by lower  holdings  of bonds  or  by issuing  bonds. 
Table 11  shows how sensitive  Auerbach's  findings  are  to assumptions 
about debt financing  versus equity financing  and about the tax rate on 
interest. If inflation  is 4 percent, the subsidy rate on equipment  is 46 
percent if half of investment is debt financed  and the rate of personal 
taxation  of interest  is 20 percent. On the other  hand,  if only a quarter  of 
investment  is debt  financed  and  the tax rate  on interest  is 40 percent,  the 
rate of subsidy is only about 7 percent. The tax rates on structures  are 
16  and  38 percent  in the two cases. 
My guess is that the effective fraction  of debt finance  is even above 
50 percent because firms  think  of dividends  as largely  precommitted.  I 
would also guess that effective taxation  of interest  income is not much 
above 20 percent. Opportunities  abound for channeling interest to 
recipients  in low tax brackets.  Further,  large  amounts  of interest  income 
are  simply  unreported.  The recent  uproar  over a modest  withholding  tax 
on interest suggests that many people think it is their moral right to 
escape taxation  on interest. 
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subsidized  and structures  are lightly taxed, but the qualitative  conclu- 
sions of Auerbach's paper are not really changed-there  is a major 
distortion  because the tax system favors equipment  over structures. 
In today's tax system the federal government  is pouring  billions of 
dollars  into subsidies  of business  equipment.  Like  all  business  subsidies, 
this one needs to be eliminated  forthwith.  Policymakers  have been led 
to these heavy subsidies by a combination  of trying  to tax income and 
by having separate corporate and personal taxes. The fact that both 
taxes generate positive revenue conceals their pernicious subsidy of 
business equipment. 
The most promising way to eliminate the gross inefficiencies of 
business taxation is to junk the current  tax system and start again. A 
progressive  consumption  tax, administered  as a value-added  tax, seems 
the best avenue. It would guarantee  effective tax rates of exactly zero 
on all types of investment,  in place of subsidies  and  taxes as at present. 
All the efficiency and equity objectives of taxation  can be achieved  in a 
straightforward,  administratively  simple, and practical  tax system. In 
that system, businesses and workers  together  would  pay a tax based on 
the sales of consumption  goods. Workers  would receive the benefit  of a 
graduated  personal  exemption,  which  could  give the system any desired 
degree  of progressivity. 
General  Discussion 
Joseph Pechman questioned whether the differential  tax rate on 
equipment  and  structures  is the majorfactor  responsible  for  the observed 
change  in the allocation  of capital.  He noted significant  tax differentials 
opened up only after 1972  whereas  the ratio  of investment  in equipment 
to  structures began a  secular upward movement long before that. 
Pechman  was not convinced  that  the tax system could  fully account  for 
this secular  trend.  Furthermore  he was not aware  of other  evidence that 
there  has been overinvestment  in equipment. 
Charles  Schultze  agreed  with  Pechman,  arguing  that  the misallocative 
effects of the tax subsidies  may be less for capital  stocks than  for other 
economic  activities.  If  demandforinvestmentgoods  is relatively  inelastic 
to change in user costs, as suggested by the accelerator investment 
model, then the main  effect of the subsidies  is to increase  firms'  profits 
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Jeffrey Shafer  cautioned  that there may be more equipment  around 
than  meets the eye: investment  that is intrinsically  related  to structures 
may  be fairly  easily disembodied  for tax purposes.  While  installation  of 
central  air conditioning  is considered  an expenditure  on structures  for 
tax purposes, installation of individual air conditioners that can be 
disconnected  is considered  equipment  expenditure.  A durable  surface 
floor  is an investment  in structures,  whereas  carpets  on the floor are an 
investment in equipment. William Brainard  observed that there is 
considerable  latitude  in the classification  of expenditures  and  that some 
of the reported  changes  may simply  reflect  more  aggressive  accounting 
practices  by firms  in response  to tax incentives. 
Several  discussants  argued  that  the discussion  of the "misallocation" 
of the capital stock should recognize that social objectives other than 
technical efficiency are involved. George Perry suggested that the 
differential  tax treatment reflected a desire to maximize investment 
stimulus per dollar of revenue lost. Congress, with the objective of 
increasing  the capital stock and productivity,  assumed that equipment 
was more responsive to tax subsidies than structures.  Michael Lovell 
recalled  Robert Crandall's  argument  that many members  of Congress 
may favor equipment  investment over structures  investment because 
they want  to encourage  employment  in the older  industrial  centers  in the 
Northeast  and  Midwest  by subsidizing  plant  modernization  while avoid- 
ing the subsidization  of plant  movement  to the Sun Belt. 
John  Shoven  commented  that  the  focus on the misallocation  of capital 
within  the corporate  sector drew attention  away from other distortions 
caused  by the corporate  income tax. Compared  with the misallocations 
Auerbach  focused on, Shoven's own work  indicated  that  greater  welfare 
losses from corporate income taxation came from the intertemporal 
misallocation of resources and from the misallocation of resources 
between  the corporate  and  noncorporate  sectors. 